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MAXIMIZING UTILITY IN ELECTRIC  
UTILITY REGULATION 
JONAS J. MONAST 
ABSTRACT 
The electric power sector is undergoing a period of profound change, reacting to econom-
ic, technological, and regulatory variables that have emerged quickly and largely without 
warning. In many states, the public utility commission (PUC) will play a key role in deter-
mining how electric utilities respond to these rapidly changing circumstances, the outcome 
of which will affect electricity rates, investor returns, public health, and local and state 
economies for decades to come. The general mandate underlying many utility commission 
proceedings—seeking the least cost option for maintaining a reliable electricity sector—
provides the PUC with considerable discretion to choose among sources of information, po-
tential outcomes, and risk assessments.  
The least cost framework is generally treated as an objective standard, but a close exam-
ination of PUC decisions demonstrates the inherent subjectivity and the value choices com-
missioners face when determining which electric utility decisions are in the public’s best 
interest. From a descriptive perspective, the effort to maximize societal benefits and mini-
mize societal costs associated with electricity generation and delivery is, at its core, a utili-
tarian exercise. Like the concept of welfare maximization that lies at the heart of the classic 
utilitarian framework, the cost minimization goal seeks to produce the greatest good for the 
greatest number through an affordable and reliable electricity sector. From the normative 
perspective, accepting that PUC decision-making is a utilitarian exercise invites a critical 
assessment of whether PUCs are succeeding in implementing the least cost mandate. This 
Article provides an overview of PUC decision-making and the least cost framework, then 
examines the inherent discretion in the least cost mandate by analyzing four recent PUC 
decisions where commissioners reach opposing decisions based on the same set of facts. The 
Article concludes by proposing mechanisms for capturing broader societal benefits through 
an expanded application of the PUCs’ existing discretion. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The electric power sector is undergoing a period of profound 
change, reacting to economic, technological, and regulatory factors 
that have emerged quickly and largely without warning. The combi-
nation of low natural gas prices and more stringent limits on mercu-
ry and other toxic emissions is driving the retirement of a large num-
ber of coal-fired power plants.1 Rooftop solar is emerging as a poten-
tially disruptive force due to the rapid decrease in the cost of photo-
voltaic panels, renewable energy tax credits, net metering policies, 
and third party leasing models that allow consumers to install solar 
at no upfront cost.2 Nationally, electricity demand dropped signifi-
cantly during the 2008–2009 economic downturn and is projected to 
remain relatively flat due to efficiency improvements throughout the 
economy. 3  In addition, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) promulgated performance standards in August 2015 to limit 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from both new and existing fossil 
fuel-fired power plants.4 The combination of factors, and the pace at 
which they have emerged, introduces a significant degree of uncer-
tainty as utilities and state regulators consider multibillion-dollar 
decisions that will impact the makeup of the electricity sector for 
decades to come.  
In many states, the public utility commission (PUC)5 plays a key 
role in determining how electric utilities respond to these rapidly 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Projected Retirements of Coal-Fired Power Plants, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.  
(July 31, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7330. 
 2. See Diane Cardwell, On Rooftops, a Rival for Utilities, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/business/energy-environment/utilities-confront-fresh-
threat-do-it-yourself-power.html?_r=1.  
 3. U.S. Economy and Electricity Demand Growth Are Linked, But Relationship Is 
Changing, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.cfm?id=10491. 
 4. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-power-plan-proposed-rule (last visit-
ed Feb. 27, 2016). 
 5. Utility commissions go by different names in different states, including the Public 
Service Commission and State Commerce Commission.  
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changing circumstances, the outcome of which will affect electricity 
rates, investor returns, public health, and local and state economies. 
This period of transition provides an important window for reexamin-
ing the role of utility commissioners, the values that animate their 
least cost determinations, and the relationship between environmen-
tal impacts and consumer prices. The general mandate underlying 
many utility commission proceedings—seeking the least cost option 
for maintaining a reliable electricity sector—provides the PUC with 
considerable discretion to choose among sources of information, de-
sirable outcomes, and risk assessments. A careful examination of 
PUC decisions exposes the subjective aspects of the least cost man-
date and the value choices embedded in the process that directly  
influence the outcome. 
Consider the quandary of a utility commission when facing the 
question of whether to invest hundreds of millions of dollars—costs 
that ratepayers will absorb—to retrofit older coal-fired power plants 
to comply with new environmental regulations. Ostensibly, the out-
come depends upon commissioners’ views of future environmental 
regulations, future natural gas prices, future technological options, 
and future electricity demand.6 Economic modeling may assist with 
the analysis, but the accuracy of modeling results depends on the as-
sumptions made regarding the future, quality of data included in the 
model, and interpretation of the results.  
Furthermore, attempts to quantify future costs and decisions re-
garding which costs to accept depend on value choices on the part of 
commissioners evaluating the data. Acknowledging the discretion 
underlying the least cost mandate allows a more open discussion 
about what values should be considered. By identifying the embedded 
values choices, and how those choices impact decisions, stakeholders 
in the PUC process can better scrutinize the regulatory process to 
determine whether or not commissions are accomplishing the least 
cost mandate in actuality. 
Decisions regarding the makeup of the electricity sector have 
wide-ranging economic and environmental impacts. While direct reg-
ulation of public health impacts generally falls outside the jurisdic-
tion of the PUC, one view of societal least cost allows consideration of 
the costs and impacts associated with emissions from power plants 
into the decision-making processes due to the financial impact of fu-
ture environmental regulations. The PUC, therefore, need not take 
                                                                                                                  
 6. See, e.g., David Hoppock et al., Determining the Least-Cost Investment for an Ex-
isting Coal Plant to Comply with EPA Regulations Under Uncertainty 2 (Nicholas Inst. for 
Envtl. Policy Sols., Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/ 
sites/default/files/publications/determining-the-least-cost-investment-for-an-existing-coal-
plant-to-comply-with-epa-regulations-under-uncertainty-paper.pdf. 
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on the role of an environmental regulatory agency in order to consid-
er, and potentially mitigate, the environmental impacts of utility-
sector investments. As recent history demonstrates, ignoring the po-
tential for future regulations to require additional capital expendi-
tures, and thus raise rates, can be just as significant as ignoring fuel 
price risk or potential changes in electricity demand.7 
The effort to maximize societal benefits and minimize societal 
costs associated with electricity generation and delivery is, at its 
core, a utilitarian exercise. Like the concept of welfare maximization 
that lies at the heart of the classic utilitarian framework, the cost 
minimization goal seeks to produce the greatest good for the greatest 
number. In the context of traditional electricity sector oversight, the 
greatest good is generally viewed as affordable and reliable electrici-
ty. Also like Jeremy Bentham’s pleasure maximization goal, the con-
cept of “least cost” invites differing interpretations, and commission 
decisions turn on which criteria are considered and how much weight 
is afforded to each variable.8 
There is no shortage of opinions regarding the appropriate struc-
ture and governance model for the electricity sector.9 This Article con-
                                                                                                                  
 7. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42144, EPA’S UTILITY MACT: 
WILL THE LIGHTS GO OUT? 4 (2012), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2012/01/19/ 
document_gw_03.pdf (stating that investments to comply with the Utility MATS rule will 
lead to an average increase of 3.1% ($3–$4 per month) in the cost of electricity and that 
electricity retail price increases will vary from a low of 1.3% in California to a high of 6.3% 
in the area served by the Southwest Power Pool, meaning Oklahoma, Kansas, and parts of 
five other states); OWEN ZINAMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., THE EVOLVING 
ROLE OF THE POWER SECTOR REGULATOR: A CLEAN ENERGY REGULATORS INITIATIVE 
REPORT 3-4 (2014), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/61570.pdf (stating that raising rates 
to reflect the true cost of delivered electricity may be necessary to ensure the financial 
health of the utility and that regulators must consider fuel delivery risks and potential fuel 
price volatilities to facilitate an energy-secure power sector); Assessment of EPA’s Utility 
MACT Proposal, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/Q&A%20Assessment%20of%20MACT%20Rule.pdf (stat-
ing that retail electricity prices will increase by an average of 3.7%); Retail Electricity Price 
Increases Due to New EPA Rules, AM. COALITION FOR CLEAN COAL ELECTRICITY (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/CustomerConnections/ACCCERegionalElectricityPriceMa
pJune2011.pdf (explaining that MATS increase electricity prices in regions of the United 
States covering all or part of thirty states, with peak-year increases exceeding ten percent 
and as high as nineteen percent); Daniel J. Weiss & Zachary Rybarczyk, Don’t Believe the 
Hype Against EPA Mercury Rules: Opponents Puff Up Costs to Consumers While Ignoring 
Benefits, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/green/news/2012/02/08/11084/dont-believe-the-hype-against-epa-mercury-rules/ (ex- 
plaining that on average electricity rates will increase by about 2%).  
 8. For a discussion of Bentham’s theories, see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (London, Oxford University Press Ware-
house 1879). See generally Hoppock et al., supra note 6. 
 9. See, e.g., SOFIA AIVALIOTI, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR ADAPTATION TO HEAT WAVES 43-44 (2015), 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/white_paper_-
_electricity_sector_adaptation_to_heat_waves.pdf (arguing that adaptation to climate 
 
2015]  MAXIMIZING UTILITY 139 
 
 
tributes to the debate by turning a critical eye toward the application of 
the least cost mandate. In most states, the existing least cost decision-
making framework allows for broad consideration of trends affecting elec-
tricity prices and the suite of societal impacts resulting from those deci-
sions. Part II of this Article outlines the current regulatory structure over-
seeing electric utility decisions, with an emphasis on the role of the state 
PUC. Part III explores the implicit value choices underlying PUCs’ appli-
cation of the least cost mandate and the range of emerging factors that 
argue for an expanded view of least cost to best achieve the interrelated 
goals of affordability, reliability, and minimization of environmental im-
pacts. Finally, Part IV offers a framework for expanding the least cost 
methodology to consider a wider range of variables and potential societal 
impacts.   
II.   THE UTILITY COMMISSION ROLE IN  
ELECTRICITY SECTOR OVERSIGHT 
Regulation of the electricity sector originated at the state level in 
the early 1900s,10 with its roots based on the principles that electrici-
ty generation and transmission constitute a natural monopoly,11 cen-
tralized control of electricity generation and transmission produces 
lower prices, and economic regulation is necessary to control the mo-
nopoly’s exercise of market power.12 States have retained primary 
jurisdiction over retail sales of electricity, but over time federal and 
                                                                                                                  
change requires long-term planning by the electricity sector, as well as engagement, com-
munication, and open dialogue between governments of all levels and other relevant stake-
holders); Hal Harvey, A New Business Model for the Electricity Sector, HILL (July 15, 2015, 
6:34 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/248104-a-new-business-model-for-the-electricity-
sector (explaining that utilities should be given a long-term mandate for the core energy 
goals: affordability, reliability, and a clean environment, and should be rewarded when 
they exceed the mandates and penalized when they fail); Chris Mooney, The U.S.’s Energy 
Infrastructure Will Need Major Changes, Says Obama Report, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/04/21/major-changes-
needed-for-u-s-power-infrastructure-says-obama-report/ (stating that the energy grid needs 
to make room for more renewable power). 
 10. William J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of 
State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1050 (2002).  
 11. See Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally: Antitrust Law and Hospital 
Mergers, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 813, 822 n.33 (1994) (“During the mid- to late 1800s, John Stuart 
Mill, responding to the growth of a competitive global economy, coined the term ‘natural mo-
nopoly’ and distinguished these monopolies from ‘artificial’ monopolies.” (citing JOHN STUART 
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 448-50 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909))); Jim Rossi, Uni-
versal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 
ENERGY L.J. 27, 29 (2000) (“[T]he economics of natural monopoly regulation provide the pre-
dominant intellectual framework supporting extraordinary obligations for providers of utility 
services.”).   
 12. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1614, 1639, 1643-44 (2014). 
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state regulation of the electricity sector has expanded.13 Numerous 
government agencies now oversee the electric utility sector, including 
state PUCs, state environmental agencies, state energy offices, the 
U.S. EPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Energy. To-
gether, these agencies pursue multiple public policy objectives, in-
cluding: providing affordable and reliable electricity, setting non-
discriminatory prices, maintaining stable prices and avoiding “rate 
shocks,” protecting public health, protecting against environmental 
harm beyond human health impacts, ensuring energy security, allow-
ing for local economic development, promoting renewable energy, 
preventing waste by promoting demand-side management and  
                                                                                                                  
 13. Id. at 1628-32. 
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energy efficiency, and other state policy goals.14 The result is a com-
plex, and at times, uncoordinated governance structure.15  
PUCs are products of state laws, and their mandates differ among 
the states. Nonetheless, there are common approaches to PUC deci-
sion-making, such as expecting utilities to seek efficient options for 
meeting electricity demand, focusing on system reliability,16 and gov-
                                                                                                                  
 14. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 824; 42 U.S.C. § 15801 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 
17001; Public Utilities Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-1 to -50 (2014). The North Carolina Public Util-
ities Act’s lengthy “declaration of policy” highlights the breadth of goals a PUC seeks to achieve, 
including:  
[P]rovid[ing] fair regulation of public utilities in the interest of the public; promot[ing] the 
inherent advantage of regulated public utilities; . . . promot[ing] adequate, reliable and 
economical utility service to all of the citizens and residents of the State; . . . assur[ing] 
that resources necessary to meet future growth through the provision of adequate, relia-
ble utility service include use of the entire spectrum of demand-side options, including 
but not limited to conservation, load management and efficiency programs; . . . re-
quir[ing] energy planning and fixing of rates in a manner to result in the least cost mix of 
generation and demand-reduction measures which is achievable, including consideration 
of appropriate rewards to utilities for efficiency and conservation which decrease utility 
bills; provid[ing] just and reasonable rates and charges for public utility services without 
unjust discrimination, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive compet-
itive practices and consistent with long-term management and conservation of energy 
resources by avoiding wasteful, uneconomic and inefficient uses of energy; . . . assur[ing] 
that facilities necessary to meet future growth can be financed by the utilities operating 
in this State on terms which are reasonable and fair to both the customers and existing 
investors of such utilities; . . . authoriz[ing] fixing of rates in such a manner as to result in 
lower costs of new facilities and lower rates over the operating lives of such new facilities 
by making provisions in the rate-making process for the investment of public utilities in 
plants under construction; encourage[ing] and promot[ing] harmony between public util-
ities, their users and the environment; . . . foster[ing] the continued service of public utili-
ties on a well-planned and coordinated basis that is consistent with the level of energy 
needed for the protection of public health and safety and for the promotion of the general 
welfare . . . seek[ing] to adjust the rate of growth of regulated energy supply facilities . . . 
cooperat[ing] with other states and with the federal government in promoting and coor-
dinating interstate and intrastate public utility service and reliability of public utility en-
ergy supply; . . . and . . . promot[ing] the development of renewable energy and energy ef-
ficiency through the implementation of a Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Port-
folio Standard (REPS) that will [d]iversify the resources used to reliably meet the energy 
needs of consumers in the State. Provide greater energy security through the use of in-
digenous energy resources available within the State. Provide improved air quality and 
other benefits to energy consumers and citizens of the State. 
§ 62-2 (effective Jan. 1, 2008). 
 15. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1 (2014). 
 16. FERC, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and its sub-
regions, and in some states, Regional Transmission Organizations or Independent System 
Operators also play important roles regarding reliability. See id. at 36-40; About NERC, 
NERC, http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2016); 
Capacity Market (RPM), PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2016) (“PJM’s capacity market, called the Reliability Pricing Model, ensures 
long-term grid reliability by securing the appropriate amount of power supply resources 
needed to meet predicted energy demand in the future.”); Reliability Operating Procedures, 
MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/MarketsOperations/ReliabilityOperatingProcedures/ 
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erning the economic aspects of electric utility regulation.17 States typ-
ically delegate primary responsibility for other aspects of electric util-
ity oversight, such as public health impacts, to other agencies. There 
are also notable differences among the states, chief among them the 
different scope of PUC authority in states following the traditional 
regulatory model versus the states that have restructured their elec-
tricity markets. Restructured states rely on competition among elec-
tricity generators to provide power and limit prices.18 PUCs in re-
structured states do not, therefore, directly regulate generation in-
vestments. 19  These states maintain the monopoly structure for 
transmission and distribution services, with PUCs overseeing rates 
that distribution companies charge to consumers, the capital expend-
itures necessary to maintain the distribution system infrastructure, 
and any electricity procurement by the distribution company.20  
The majority of states maintain the traditional regulatory model, 
with electric utilities operating as vertically integrated firms, control-
ling generation, transmission, and retail sales, and subject to rate 
regulation by the state utility commission.21 Of all the agencies over-
seeing aspects of the electric power sector, the PUC in a traditionally 
regulated state is most directly involved in a regulated utility’s deci-
sions regarding how it meets electricity demand, including whether 
to build a new facility and, if so, what type.  
This Article focuses on traditionally regulated states and draws 
upon representative proceedings to identify common approaches and 
notable differences in approaches to least cost planning. This Article 
does not attempt to provide a thorough examination of any particular 
state. The following subsections offer an overview of PUC decision-
making, including the elements that utility commissions must bal-
ance when determining whether to allow utilities to recover expendi-
                                                                                                                  
Pages/ReliabilityOperatingProcedures.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (noting that the 
RTO “ensures real-time operating reliability of the interconnected bulk electric  
system . . . within the MISO reliability footprint”). 
 17. Commissioners typically refer to themselves as economic regulators. David Had-
ley, Comm’r, Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n, The Commissioner’s Challenge 3-4 (Oct. 4, 
2004), http://www.gasification.org/uploads/eventLibrary/03HADL_Paper.pdf (“Today I am 
an economic regulator. Regulated utilities face folks like me all across the country with one 
thought – least cost. . . . There are many valid arguments about the cost of NOT being en-
vironmentally responsible. But as an economic regulator, I must approve of continually 
increasing cost of environmental compliance for coal fired power plants.”). 
 18. See Peter Fox-Penner & Heidi Bishop, Mission, Structure, and Governance in Fu-
ture Electric Markets: Some Observations, 89 OR. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2011). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 
2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html. Note that 
vertically integrated utilities also purchase and sell electricity in wholesale markets.  
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tures through rates charged to consumers and the least cost frame-
work that PUCs in most states utilize to balance the competing in-
terests of ratepayers, utilities, and their investors. 
A.   Cost-of-Service Rate Setting 
The traditional state regulatory model for the electricity sector 
emerged based on the natural monopoly concept.22 Due to the high 
cost of infrastructure, it was more efficient for a single firm to own 
and operate generation and transmission assets rather than allow 
competition through redundant infrastructure investments.23 States 
relied on utility commissions to control the market power that results 
from the monopoly structure.24 In exchange for an exclusive service 
territory, the utility is subject to rate regulation by the state PUC.25  
PUCs set rates based on the cost of providing the service, includ-
ing capital costs and operating costs.26 In general, a commission must 
determine that a utility expenditure was prudently incurred before 
including that cost in the utility’s “rate base.”27 Prudency may turn 
on a number of factors, including whether a utility asset is “used and 
useful” (i.e., it provides a service to customers).28 Due to the challenge 
                                                                                                                  
 22. See Boyd, supra note 12, at 1643-44. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See, e.g., DIV. OF POLICY ANALYSIS & INTERGOVERNMENTAL LIAISON, FLA. PUB. 
SERV. COMM’N, MARKET POWER IN A TRANSITIONING ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 1 (2001), 
http://www.psc.state.fl.us/Files/PDF/Publications/Reports/Electricgas/markpwr.pdf. 
 25. KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN THE 
INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF ADAPTATION 5-8 (2012), 
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/stateregulation/Documents/COSR_history_final.pdf.  
 26. JONATHAN A. LESSER & LEONARDO R. GIACCHINO, FUNDAMENTALS OF ENERGY 
REGULATION 78-82 (2d ed. 2013).  
[T]he standard ratemaking formula: R = O + (B x r), where R is the utility’s al-
lowed revenue requirement, O is its operating cost, B is rate base, and r is the 
utility’s cost of capital. B increases as the utility’s investment increases. O in-
creases to the extent of the annual depreciation of the plant but decreases to 
the extent that the new plant permits a reduction in the use of plants with 
higher operating costs (principally fuel costs).  
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants 
and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 511 (1984) (footnote omitted). 
 27. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3, at 3617(d) (2015) (affording presumption of 
prudence for utility actions consistent with an approved resource plan); Pub. Serv. Co. of 
Colo., No. C13-0436 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 21, 2013) (denying recovery of certain 
smart grid investments based on the utility’s failure to demonstrate prudence). 
 28. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 661 A.2d 131, 137-38 
(D.C. 1995); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 281 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1960); 
Glustrom v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 280 P.3d 662, 669 (Colo. 2012) (noting that the 
“used and useful” test is “one of several permissible tools of ratemaking, one that need not 
be . . . employed in every instance” (quoting Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); North Carolina ex rel. Utils. 
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inherent in determining what qualifies as a prudent investment on 
the part of the regulated utility, commissions traditionally base pru-
dency determinations on laws and other circumstances in existence 
at the time of the decision.29 Commissions also set the rate of return 
that utilities earn for the capital expenditures included in the rate 
base and determine which variable costs, such as fuel and labor ex-
penditures, utilities may recover from consumers.30  
The rate-setting process grants broad discretion to commissions. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, and subsequently state courts, recognized 
that agencies with the delegated legislative power to set rates are not 
bound “to the service of any single formula or combination of formu-
las.”31 These agencies  
are free, within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the 
pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular cir-
cumstances. Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings 
made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts can-
not intervene in the absence of a clear showing that the limits of 
due process have been overstepped.32  
If the agency decision, “as applied to the facts before it and viewed 
in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, [the Court’s] inquiry is at 
                                                                                                                  
Comm’n v. Carolina Water Serv., Inc., 439 S.E.2d 127 (N.C. 1994); SCOTT HEMPLING, 
PRESIDE OR LEAD?: THE ATTRIBUTES AND ACTIONS OF EFFECTIVE REGULATORS 190-92 (2d 
ed. 2013) (“Courts have defined prudence circularly, as avoiding ‘unreasonable costs,’ oper-
ating at ‘lowest feasible cost,’ and ‘operat[ing] with all reasonable economies.’ ” (alteration 
in original) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Upstate N.Y. v. Lundy, 218 N.E.2d 274, 277  
(N.Y. 1966))).  
 29. See, e.g., Ky. Power Co., No. 2009-00545 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 28, 2010) 
(denying Kentucky’s application for approval of renewable energy purchase agreement for 
wind energy resources between); Appalachian Power Co., 263 P.U.R. 4th 297 (W. Va. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Mar. 6, 2008), 2008 WL 1758812 (order on the application for a certificate of 
public convenience & necessity for a 629 megawatt integrated gasification combined cycle 
generating facility in mason county; Appalachian Power Co., No. PUE-2007-00068 (Va. 
State Corp. Comm’n Apr. 14, 2008) (final order denying the application for approval of a 
rate adjustment clause under section 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia). 
 30. See LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 26, at 78-82.  
 31. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942). States 
have generally adopted the Federal Power Commission holding for state PUCs. See, e.g., S. 
Conn. Gas Co. v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, No. CV094021665S, 2010 WL 1664975, 
at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2010) (citing Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 586); City of 
Miami v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 208 So. 2d 249, 255-56 (Fla. 1968) (first quoting Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); then citing Nat. Gas Pipeline 
Co., 315 U.S. at 575); Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 589 N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (Ohio 
1992) (first quoting Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. at 591; then citing Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 
U.S. at 575); see also George Blum et al., Rates and RateMaking, 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities 
§ 26 (2015). 
 32. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 586.  
2015]  MAXIMIZING UTILITY 145 
 
 
an end.”33 The PUC’s discretion is subject to important limitations, 
however.34 In addition to complying with all statutory mandates, the 
rates must allow utilities to recover costs that were prudently in-
curred, maintain the financial integrity of the firm, compensate equi-
ty investors for the risks they assume, and enable the firm to attract 
needed capital.35  Rates may not be confiscatory, and commissions 
must balance the interests of consumers and investors.36 In the end, 
rates set by the commission generally must satisfy the “just and rea-
sonable” standard, which courts interpret to address both consumer 
and investor interests.37  
                                                                                                                  
 33. Id. While not binding, commission precedent may still be persuasive, and review-
ing courts may nonetheless look to commission precedent when evaluating whether a rate 
case is arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Cont’l Tel. Co. of the S. v. Ala. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 427 So. 2d 981, 993 (Ala. 1982) (“[W]hile stare decisis does not apply to decisions 
of administrative agencies such as the Commission, consistency is essential if arbitrariness 
is to be avoided.”) (emphasis added); North Carolina ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Carolina Util. 
Customers Ass’n, 500 S.E.2d 693, 706 (N.C. 1998) (“[T]he final order of the [Utilities] 
Commission [in a general rate case] is not within the doctrine of stare decisis . . . prior deci-
sions of [the Supreme Court] regarding general questions of law and the principles under-
lying those decisions serve to guide the Court’s decisions in individual cases.”) (third alter-
ation in original) (citations omitted). 
 34. See, e.g., LESSER & GIACCHINO, supra note 26, at 52-54.  
 35. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 605; see Bluefield Water Works & Improvement 
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923).  
 36. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 605. State courts and utility commissions follow 
Hope Natural Gas. See, e.g., Glustrom v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 280 P.3d 662, 669 (Colo. 
2012); see also S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 113 So. 2d 622, 656 
(Miss. 1959) (“A fair return is one which, under prudent and economical management, is 
just and reasonable to both the public and the utility. . . . By that standard the return to 
the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterpris-
es having corresponding risks and sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity 
of the business. What the public is entitled to demand is that no more should be exacted 
from the rate payers than the services are reasonably worth.”). 
 37. The “just and reasonable” language has its roots in the Natural Gas Act. 15  
U.S.C. § 717c (2012). State laws governing PUCs have generally adopted the same frame-
work. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-101(1) (2015) (requiring utility rates to be “just and 
reasonable”); IDAHO CODE § 61-302 (2015) (requiring that “[e]very public utility shall fur-
nish, provide and maintain such service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as 
shall promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the 
public, and as shall be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable”); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 77-3-33(1) (2015) (stating that the public utility company is entitled to “fair, just 
and reasonable rates for the services rendered or to be rendered by it to any person”); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 62-130(a) (2014) (requiring the PUC to “make, fix, establish or allow just and 
reasonable rates for all public utilities subject to its jurisdiction”); WASH. REV.  
CODE § 80.28.020 (2014) (authorizing the commission to fix rates determined to be reason-
able and just); WIS. STAT. § 196.03(1) (2015) (requiring rates to be reasonable and just). 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Hope Natural Gas, judicial inquiries now typically 
focus on whether the end result of the rate-setting process satisfies the just and reasonable 
standard and will not second-guess how the commission arrives at the rate. See Hope Nat. 
Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 605.  
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Commissions typically have additional duties beyond rate-setting. 
For example, they may approve siting proposals 38  and, in some 
states, review long-term, integrated resource plans (IRPs) wherein 
utilities evaluate various scenarios to determine likely future re-
source needs.39 PUCs may also have a range of duties related to envi-
ronmental goals, including obligations related to state environmental 
policy compliance, implementation of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency mandates, and resource planning.40  
B.   The Least Cost Framework 
PUCs seek an outcome that allows the utility to plan for the fu-
ture, prevents electric utilities operating as monopolies from taking 
advantage of market power and charging unreasonably high rates, 
allows the utility to hedge various forms of risk without approving 
unnecessary expenditures, and allows returns on investment at a 
level that maintains the firm’s creditworthiness. Viewed from a theo-
retical perspective, this effort to balance competing interests in pur-
suit of an affordable and reliable electricity sector is analogous to the 
utilitarian goal of maximizing societal welfare by promoting the 
greatest pleasure for the greatest number. 41  Thus, utilitarianism 
“perspectives” discourse provides an analytical approach for identify-
ing and weighing multiple factors and seeking the optimal outcome. 
Moreover, the consequentialist utilitarian approach judges the merits 
of the action on the outcome (e.g., rates that are just and reasonable) 
rather than the methodology for determining the course of action 
(e.g., which factors were given more or less weight when setting the 
rates). In the PUC context, cost minimization coupled with reliability 
replace welfare maximization as the desired outcome. To protect against 
profit maximizing incentives, states typically employ a “least cost” 
framework for assessing whether a utility’s investment is prudent.42 
                                                                                                                  
 38. See Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility 
Commissions (2006), 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 42 (2006). 
 39. See, e.g., U.S. States with Integrated Resource Planning or Similar Planning Pro-
cess, REG. ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2009), http://www.energycollection.us/Energy-Planning/ 
US-States-IRP.pdf. 
 40. Dworkin et al., supra note 38, at 6; Michael Dworkin et al., The Environmental 
Duties of Public Utility Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 331 (2001). 
 41. Proponents of utilitarianism offer various characterizations of the optimal out-
comes. Bentham and Mill, early advocates of utilitarianism as a policymaking tool, sug-
gested that the optimal outcome is one that maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain. See 
BENTHAM, supra note 8, at 3. For a detailed discussion of classic philosophic concepts of 
rights and duties applied to the energy sector, see BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL & MICHAEL H. 
DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE: PROBLEMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES (2014). 
 42. Melissa Powers, Sustainable Energy Subsidies, 43 ENVTL. L. 211, 221 (2013). 
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This approach may appear as a statutory or regulatory obligation,43 
or PUCs themselves may introduce the concept as a factor in pruden-
cy determinations.44  
The regulation of the natural monopoly seeks to maximize societal 
welfare by allowing the firm to operate without competition while 
preventing abuse of market power.45 Thus, the characterization of 
PUC decision-making as a pursuit of the classic utilitarian goal of 
welfare maximization is descriptive rather than a normative argu-
ment for altering the regulatory approach. As previously described,46 
the PUC is charged with considering multiple factors when setting 
electricity rates. The different stakeholders affected by the outcome 
of a PUC decision—residential and commercial electricity consumers, 
industrial electricity consumers, utility shareholders, investors issu-
ing debt to finance a utility’s capital investments, elected officials, 
citizens affected by the environmental impacts of electricity genera-
tion, individuals and businesses that may benefit from low energy 
prices attracting additional economic development to a region, firms 
manufacturing electricity generation equipment—may have their 
own views of an optimal outcome depending on how it will affect their 
core interests. The shareholder seeks increasing share value and 
regular dividends. The industrial consumer seeks to maintain low 
electricity rates to reduce input costs. The financial institution issu-
ing debt may prefer a larger capital expenditure to generate larger 
returns. State legislators and governors may seek to avoid sharp in-
creases in electricity rates. Utility commissioners themselves are also 
interested stakeholders. Whether elected or appointed, commission-
ers operate in a political environment that may create a disincentive 
to approve rate increases.  
                                                                                                                  
 43. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 226-18(c)(3), (5) (2013) (stating that the policy of the 
state shall “[e]nsure, to the extent that new supply‐side resources are needed, that the 
development or expansion of energy systems uses the least‐cost energy supply option and 
maximizes efficient technologies”); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 69‐3‐1204(1) (2014) (requir-
ing electric utilities to file a plan that meets customer needs in the most cost‐effective 
manner); 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE 4-8-3 (2015) (requiring the PUC to “ensure [that] a utility’s 
proposal is consistent with acquiring the least-cost mix of demand-side and supply-side 
resources to reliably meet the long-term electric service requirements of the utility’s cus-
tomers”); MONT. ADMIN. R. 38.5.2001-.2016 (2015) (defining guidelines for least cost plan-
ning for electric utilities). 
 44. See, e.g., Ky. Power Co., No. 2009-00545 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 28, 2010). 
The least cost mandate may also appear as the “lowest reasonable costs.” See Miss. Power 
Co., No. 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484068, at *2 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 3, 2012) (final 
certificate order). 
 45. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law out of the Deference Trap in Regulated 
Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 623 (2005) (“For most of the twentieth century, 
cost-of-service regulation provided regulators a ready forum for ensuring that rates did not 
discriminate in ways that caused serious losses to social welfare.”). 
 46. See supra Section II.A. 
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Both the utilitarian philosophers and the commissioners seeking 
to implement policy goals that are, at their core, utilitarian face criti-
cism regarding the conceptualization of the optimal outcome and how 
the decision-maker assigns weights to various factors that inform the 
outcome. Critics of the utilitarian theory as a guide to personal be-
havior or policy choices point out that the theory fails to account for 
variability in preferences and is subjective regarding the number of 
variables to consider or what weight to give those variables.47 Moreo-
ver, the theory depends on an accurate assessment of the conse-
quences of a decision, despite the inherent difficulty projecting what 
those consequences may be.  
PUC processes suffer from the same deficiencies. Although the fo-
cus on cost minimization rather than welfare maximization arguably 
provides a more objective standard, PUC cases turn on subjective as-
sessments. For example, an inquiry focusing on a narrow range of 
near-term variables will likely produce a dramatically different out-
come than one that weighs a broader range of variables and considers 
impacts over time.48 In many states, the least cost mandate is general 
enough to allow either approach, but PUCs generally apply the man-
date in a manner than limits the scope of costs taken into considera-
tion to those associated with capital investments. As Part III demon-
strates,49 commissioners serving on the same PUC may assign differ-
ent weight to variables such as certainty, nearness in time, fuel di-
versity, risk hedging, environmental impacts, and even interpreta-
tions of electricity demand growth projections. The outcome of those 
PUC decisions may turn as much on commissioners’ value choices 
and views of the future as on objective assessments of cost and risk.  
Proponents of a strict adherence to benefit-cost analysis may ar-
gue that the theoretical utilitarian argument is unnecessary, and in-
stead might promote a more robust effort to quantify the potential 
results of a utility decision. There is a lengthy and ever expanding 
body of scholarship debating the merits and limits of a benefit-cost 
analysis.50 Although the benefit-cost approach frames the discussion 
in contemporary regulatory language, it raises many of the same 
questions as the utilitarian inquiry—e.g., costs for whom, which ben-
                                                                                                                  
 47. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103, 111-19 (1979). 
 48. See Dalia Patiño-Echeverri et al., Economic and Environmental Costs of Regulato-
ry Uncertainty for Coal-Fired Power Plants, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 578, 578-84 (2009). 
 49. See infra Part III.  
 50. For competing views of benefit-cost analysis, compare FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA 
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF 
NOTHING (2004), with Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, 
and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153 (2000).  
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efits to consider, and what methods are used to quantify the costs 
and impacts.51 Benefit-cost analysis is particularly limited when deal-
ing with “inherently political questions involving contested norma-
tive issues.”52  
Although this Article does not engage directly in the ongoing de-
bate over the proper application of cost considerations in administra-
tive proceedings, the debate is relevant for PUC decision-making. 
Cost impacts are at the heart of PUC inquiries, yet quantifying the 
potential impacts of electric utility actions is inherently subjective. 
As the following subsections demonstrate, commissioners choose 
among a range of reasonable viewpoints regarding the need for new 
generation and the factors to consider when evaluating whether an 
option is cost-effective, and those choices may lead to very different 
near-term and long-term impacts on electricity rates and environ-
mental impacts of the electricity sector. This Article opts for the lens 
of classic utilitarian theory as a framework for examining the value 
choices inherent in the least cost inquiry and alternative approaches 
that may maximize societal benefits beyond simply near-term low 
rates for electricity. Rather than undermining the argument for view-
ing PUC decisions through the utility maximization lens, the discre-
tion and embedded value choices argue for an explicit consideration 
of a wider range of variables. 
 1.   The Many Views of “Cost” in Electricity Sector Regulation 
Although the observation that utility regulation, as practiced in 
many states, is an exercise in utility maximization is descriptive, a 
normative argument follows. If, indeed, PUCs aim to maximize socie-
tal benefits, one must inquire whether they are achieving that goal 
given the wide-ranging economic, health, and environmental impacts 
that flow from PUC decisions.  
                                                                                                                  
 51. Compare Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Break-
even Analysis, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (2014) (arguing that breakeven analysis “may 
fail to improve the rationality of decisions, especially in hard cases”), with Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1392 (2014) (proposing use of 
“breakeven analysis” to “identify a lower or upper bound for regulatory benefits” in circum-
stances where quantification is challenging). See also Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency 
and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 245 (2000) 
(“Two neoclassicists who agree as to the moral significance of efficiency, and as to the 
equivalence of welfare and preference satisfaction, may disagree about whether some fur-
ther moral criterion (besides efficiency) is also relevant in evaluating regulatory choices, 
options, and institutions. One neoclassicist may think that the environment has intrinsic 
value, apart from human welfare; another may deny that. Or, one neoclassicist may think 
that the fair distribution of welfare, as well as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is an important 
thing; another neoclassicist may be solely concerned with efficiency.”) (footnote omitted). 
 52. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1557 (2011). 
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Utilities assess infrastructure needs and the associated costs 
through scenario analysis that considers variables such as fuel price 
fluctuation, policy changes, transmission needs, and technology  
options.53    
Utility planning also includes qualitative variables, such as “the 
importance of fuel diversity, [a firm’s] environmental profile, the 
emergence and development of new technologies, and regional eco-
nomic development considerations.”54 Utilities, regional transmission 
organizations, and regulators seek to quantify benefits associated 
with the qualitative variables in order to justify the costs, but that 
process is challenging and ballpark estimates sometimes must suf-
fice.55 Both the qualitative and quantitative assessments rely on val-
ue choices regarding which variables to consider, how much weight to 
assign to different variables, and the scope of costs. 
The broadest view of the costs associated with electricity genera-
tion would incorporate not just electricity rates, but also health costs 
resulting from pollutants emitted by the facilities, costs to the local 
economy if a power plant contributes to the area’s nonattainment 
status for any National Ambient Air Quality Standard, the full suite 
of costs associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
and externalities arising from the production and transport of the 
fuels.56 From the beginning of public utility regulation, states have 
opted to separate the cost of service from numerous other costs asso-
ciated with the production and consumption of electricity, relying on 
other government agencies to address those externalities. That sepa-
ration does not absolve the PUC of all responsibility for the costs be-
yond electricity rates, however, as the initial decisions regarding 
                                                                                                                  
 53. See, e.g., DUKE ENERGY, THE DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS INTEGRATED RESOURCE 
PLAN (ANNUAL REPORT) 7 (2012) [hereinafter DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012] (“Quantitative 
analysis provides insights on future risks and uncertainties associated with fuel prices, 
load growth rates, capital and operating costs, and other variables.”); GA. POWER CO., 2013 
INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN AND APPLICATION FOR DECERTIFICATION OF PLANT BRANCH 
UNITS 3 AND 4, PLANT MCMANUS UNITS 1 AND 2, PLANT KRAFT UNITS 1-4, PLANT YATES 
UNITS 1-5, PLANT BOULEVARD UNITS 2 AND 3 AND PLANT BOWEN UNIT 6, at 1-28, GA. PSC 
DOCUMENT FILING # 145981 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.psc.state.ga.us/factsv2/ 
Document.aspx?documentNumber=145981 (follow “Attachment: 145981.zip” hyperlink; 
then open “IRP MAIN DOC AND DECERT APP); TENN. VALLEY AUTH., INTEGRATED 
RESOURCE PLAN: TVA’S ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY FUTURE 61-77 (2011). 
 54. DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012, supra note 53. 
 55. See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 721 F.3d 764 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
 56. The electricity sector is the primary emitter of mercury and sulfur dioxide in the 
United States and is a major contributor of emissions of nitrogen oxides—precursors to 
ground level ozone. The 2011 National Emissions Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2011inventory.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
In 2013, the sector was also responsible for 31% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Sources 
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
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what to build are the foundation for many of the other societal costs. 
In some circumstances, it may be less costly to society to avoid poten-
tially large rate increases in the future by investing in higher cost 
generation options at the outset.57  
Despite these impacts on public health and the environment, 
states diverge regarding the range of environmental and public 
health impacts that the commission may consider. Colorado law, for 
example, requires the PUC to “give the fullest possible consideration 
to the cost-effective implementation of new clean energy and energy-
efficient technologies in its consideration of generation acquisitions 
for electric utilities, bearing in mind the beneficial contributions such 
technologies make to Colorado’s energy security, economic prosperity, 
insulation from fuel price increases, and environmental protection.”58 
In addition, the Colorado PUC “may give consideration to the likeli-
hood of new environmental regulation and the risk of higher future 
costs associated with the emission of greenhouse gases such as car-
bon dioxide when it considers utility proposals to acquire re-
sources.”59 North Carolina’s Public Utilities Act (NC PUA) offers an 
example of a less specific environmental obligation, instructing the 
state’s commission to “encourage and promote harmony between pub-
lic utilities, their users and the environment.”60 Legislatures in other 
states expressly prohibit PUCs from considering certain environmen-
tal impacts in the rate-setting process.61 For example, North Dakota 
law prohibits the state’s PUC from “us[ing], requir[ing] the use of, or 
allow[ing] electric utilities to use environmental externality values in 
the planning, selection, or acquisition of electric resources or the set-
ting of rates for providing electric service.”62 
Legislation explicitly expanding the range of factors PUCs consid-
er may foster consideration of a broader suite of public policy goals 
affected by electric utility decisions. However, in the absence of legis-
                                                                                                                  
 57. See, e.g., Richard N. L. Andrews, State Environmental Policy Innovations: North 
Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act, 43 ENVTL. L. 881 (2013); David Hoppock et al., Benefits 
of Early State Action in Environmental Regulation of Electric Utilities: North Carolina’s 
Clean Smokestacks Act (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Sols., Working Paper No. NI WP 
12-05, 2012). 
 58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-123(1)(a) (2015).  
 59. Id. § 40-2-123(1)(b). 
 60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a)(5) (2014). Notably, the mission statement on the  
NC Utilities Commission website lists a broad range of PUC obligations found in the  
NC PUA’s “Declaration of Policy” but neglects to mention the environmental provision.  
See Welcome to the North Carolina Utilities Commission, N.C. UTILS. COMM’N, 
http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 61. See Richard D. Gary & Michael L. Teague, The Inclusion of Externalities in Elec-
tric Generation Resource Planning: Coal in the Crossfire, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 839, 862-63 
(1993). 
 62. 1995 N. D. Laws 1311.  
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lation specifically limiting the factors they may consider, PUCs can 
generally take steps within the least cost framework to pursue a 
range of societal objectives affected by the electricity sector. For ex-
ample, although direct regulation of public health impacts may fall 
outside the regulatory purview of the utility commissioner, it does 
not follow that commissioners must turn a blind eye to the health 
impacts of their decisions.63 PUC decisions affect the amount and 
types of emissions, and due to the costs locked in when constructing a 
new power plant, they also affect the economic impact of changing 
course.64 The EPA’s Mercury Air Toxics Rule (requiring reductions in 
mercury emissions) and the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) 
(limiting sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate 
matter (PM) emissions originating at coal-fired power plants in up-
wind states and affecting a downwind state’s compliance with air 
quality standards) offer cautionary tales regarding the risk of ignor-
ing the prospect of more stringent environmental regulations. Both 
rules affected the cost of existing coal-fired power plants, with the 
impacts differing by state based on the number of coal-fired power 
plants that did not meet the new standards. The states with less reli-
ance on uncontrolled coal-fired power plants were less affected by 
new EPA regulations.65 Ignoring the prospect of higher costs over the 
lifetime of a facility may subject consumers to higher prices while 
also robbing them of the benefits of early action.66 Therefore, viewing 
environmental issues through the lens of potential increases in oper-
ating costs over the lifetime of a power plant should allow commis-
sioners to consider impacts on public health and the environment 
under existing least cost framework unless explicitly prohibited by 
state law from doing so.67  
                                                                                                                  
 63. See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. High Rock Lake Ass’n, 245 
S.E.2d 787, 790 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that environmental considerations are “gen-
erally left to other regulatory agencies, except as they affect the cost and efficiency of the 
proposed generating facility”). This Article is not proposing to burden PUCs with the pri-
mary responsibility of mitigating climate change. Such a broad problem requires attention 
from a range of state and federal agencies. 
 64. Patrick Bean & David Hoppock, Least-Risk Planning for Electric Utilities 3 n.2 
(Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Sols, Working Paper No. NI WP13-05, 2013) (“Electricity 
sector capital investments tend to have low salvage values, meaning most costs are sunk 
and unrecoverable if the investment does not operate as planned.”).  
 65. The North Carolina Clean Smokestacks Act is an example of a state taking action 
to reduce SO2, NOx, and mercury before the promulgation of Utility MATS and CSAPR, 
resulting in lower costs. Clean Smokestacks Act, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws. 4 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-143, 143-215.105-.114C (2014)). See generally Andrews, 
supra note 57; Hoppock et al., supra note 57. 
 66. See Hoppock et al., supra note 57, at 16. 
 67. See, e.g., 1995 N. D. Laws 1311 (prohibiting the PUC from considering environ-
mental externalities).  
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Uncertainty about the future complicates the cost minimization 
challenge, and utilities and PUCs may compensate by assuming per-
fect foresight when inputting assumptions into energy models.68 The 
resulting projections may fail to consider the potential cost impacts of 
changing circumstances and also may undervalue non-cost factors. 
As a result, the traditional application of the least cost framework 
may undermine the goal of minimizing cost in the long term, as poli-
cy shifts to force electric utilities to internalize environmental exter-
nalities or as consumers bear costs in other ways such as medical 
bills.69  
Achieving the least cost goal during the next one to two decades, 
and avoiding stranded generation assets resulting from changing 
economic and regulatory factors, is particularly complex due to the 
increased level of uncertainty regarding technology, markets, and 
regulation. Expanding the variables embedded in the least cost as-
sessment could allow regulators to incorporate temporal considera-
tions (e.g., short-term versus long-term “least cost” approaches), po-
tential technological advances affecting demand or driving costs 
down if new technology can achieve market penetration, and public 
health and environmental impacts of electricity sector actions.  
 2.   Assessing the Least Cost Option 
Under the least cost framework, the optimal choice is the least 
cost investment after accounting for other factors such as reliability, 
state renewable energy or energy efficiency mandates, other legal 
                                                                                                                  
 68. Perfect foresight in the modeling context refers to modeling exercises that assume 
scenarios remain constant throughout the period in question. For example, a scenario as-
suming high natural gas prices would maintain that assumption for each year included in 
the modeling exercise. The results produced by this approach may differ significantly from 
an exercise that tests the impacts of periodic fluctuations in fuel prices. Compare, NW. 
POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, SIXTH NORTHWEST CONSERVATION AND ELECTRIC 
POWER PLAN (2010) (utilizing an iterative modeling process with fuel price fluctuations), 
with U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2040 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf (analyzing numerous sce-
narios using a perfect foresight approach for each scenario).  
 69. See, e.g., HEALTH & ENVTL. IMPACTS DIV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-
1-11-011, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS 
STANDARDS, at ES-3 (2011), http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf 
(stating that emissions reductions under the final MATS rule could yield health co-benefits 
of up to $90 billion dollars in 2016, based on the avoidance of mercury- or fine particle-
related health problems such as: 4200 to 11,000 premature deaths, 2600 hospitalizations 
for respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, 4700 nonfatal heart attacks, and 3.2 million 
missed work days due to respiratory symptoms); JOHN A. ROMLEY ET AL., THE IMPACT OF 
AIR QUALITY ON HOSPITAL SPENDING xi-xii tbl.S.2 (2010), http://www.rand.org/ 
content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR777.pdf (explaining that not 
meeting federal clean air standards for PM2.5 and ozone caused an estimated 29,808 
health events, resulting in an estimated $193 million spent on hospital care in California 
from 2005–2007).  
154  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:135 
 
 
obligations, and a range of risk factors. The electricity sector is not 
static, however. New information, changing market conditions, more 
stringent regulations, and emerging technologies can all alter the 
calculus.70 There may be compelling reasons, therefore, to invest in a 
more expensive option in the near-term to hedge against potential 
increases in operating costs and capital expenditures in the future. 
Many large-scale capital investments for new electricity genera-
tion assume power plants will operate for a minimum of three to four 
decades.71 Investors are entitled to recoup capital investments and 
earn a rate of return on those investments once a PUC determines 
that the expenditures were prudent and approves incorporating the 
expenditures into the utility’s rate base.72 Circumstances may change 
dramatically during a plant’s service life, potentially resulting in ad-
ditional capital expenditures to comply with new regulations, fluctu-
ation in operating costs due to fuel price volatility, and competition 
from newer facilities utilizing more efficient technologies.73  
Hedging against the risk of costly future regulatory developments 
(e.g., regulation of a new pollutant or tightening existing emission 
limitations) presents a particularly challenging proposition for PUCs. 
Approving an electric utility investment in anticipation of a regulato-
ry change that never materializes would result in consumers paying 
higher rates than required by existing law. Conversely, ignoring the 
prospect of increased costs due to future emission limits may cause a 
generating facility to face early retirement or additional costs to 
comply with the new regulations—costs that recent examples demon-
strate could exceed $1 billion for an individual facility.74 Distinguish-
ing between legitimate hedging and efforts aimed at simply maximiz-
ing investors’ returns, therefore, is an important, yet difficult, task 
for the utility commissioner. 
Consider the scenario where a regulated monopoly determines 
that it must construct a 500-megawatt (MW) power plant to meet 
electricity demand. The firm is considering either a $500 million con-
ventional natural gas combined cycle plant or a $3.5 billion coal-fired 
                                                                                                                  
 70. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 26 (discussing the impact of changing circumstances 
on nuclear power plant construction). 
 71. Age of Electric Power Generators Varies Widely, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.  
(JUNE 16, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1830 (noting that 51% of 
the U.S. electric generating capacity was at least 30 years old at the end of 2010). 
 72. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. 
Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923).  
 73. See, e.g., STAN KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34746, POWER PLANTS: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS 24 (2008) (noting that “fuel prices have been notoriously dif-
ficult to predict”); Pierce, supra note 26, at 509-10. For more discussion of uncertainty and 
irreversibility in the electricity sector, see infra Section III.B. 
 74. Hoppock et al., supra note 57, at 17. 
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gasification plant that captures CO2 emissions.75 The rate structure 
would allow the firm’s shareholders to receive seven times the return 
on the coal-fired investment. Assuming each option would result in 
the same rate of return and a PUC determination of prudency would 
ensure the ability to recover all capital costs, the rational economic 
actor would seek to maximize value for shareholders and investors.76  
To protect against profit maximizing incentives, commissioners 
typically employ a “constrained least cost” framework to assess 
whether an investment is prudent. Under this framework, the opti-
mal choice is the least cost investment after accounting for other fac-
tors, such as grid reliability, state and federal laws, existing infra-
structure, and fuel price projections. These non-cost objectives act as 
constraints on a cost minimization goal. Some non-cost variables are 
more straightforward to assess than others. State laws may change 
the least cost calculus by requiring utilities and PUCs to consider 
environmental externalities when evaluating the potential options, or 
mandating renewable energy and energy efficiency investments 
through portfolio standards.77 Others are more difficult to quantify, 
such as uncertainty regarding fuel prices and future regulations.  
Some states have deliberately moved away from a narrow “least 
cost” approach. The California Public Utilities Commission, for ex-
ample, opted for a “least cost, best fit” analysis that recognizes there 
may be generation options, such as renewable energy, that are more 
costly but offer additional benefits.78 In other states, departing from a 
strict adherence to a “least cost” approach would require statutory or 
regulatory changes, yet even a narrow interpretation of least cost in-
vites consideration of factors that affect near-term and long-term 
electricity rates.  
                                                                                                                  
 75. These estimates are based on the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 
2013 capital cost estimates for new power plants. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UPDATED 
CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS (2013), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf. According to the EIA 
estimates, the average overnight capital cost for a conventional natural gas combined cycle 
(NGCC) plant a $917 per kilowatt hour (KWh). Id. at 6. Using these assumptions, the cost 
for a 500 MW plant would be $458.5 million. The estimate for a single unit coal-fired inte-
grated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), such as the new plant under construction in 
Kemper County, Mississippi, is $6599 per KWh, or $3.29 billion. Id. The cost estimates are 
not directly analogous because the estimated nominal capacities for the two plants differ 
(620 MW for the NGCC unit and 520 MW for the IGCC unit). Id. 
 76. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962); Boyd, supra note 12, at 1651-58. 
 77. See, e.g., DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012, supra note 53 (discussing quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of system planning options). 
 78. Jeff Guldner & Meghan Grabel, Dealing with Change: The Long-Term Challenge 
for the Electric Industry, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 6 (2008).  
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Utility commissions may approve a more expensive electricity 
generation option if it offers additional benefits such as diversity in 
the fuel mix or long-term price certainty. Commissions may also al-
low utilities to reduce exposure to regulatory risk, although, as noted 
above, PUCs may find these risks difficult to assess.79 Under the ex-
ample in the previous paragraph, if a regulated firm justifies the $3.5 
billion option solely on the likelihood of a future environmental regu-
lation and the regulation is never implemented, shareholders would 
reap large returns while consumers would pay higher rates to miti-
gate a risk that never materializes. 
As the IGCC example demonstrates, the stakes are high. Deci-
sions regarding whether to construct new power plants and, if so, 
what types of power plants to build and when to build them have 
broad impacts on electricity rates, local economies, and public health. 
New, large-scale power plants are major investments, and utilities 
generally expect to operate a plant for decades to recover costs.80 Un-
der normal circumstances, ratepayers must compensate the utility 
even if changing circumstances result in higher than anticipated 
costs. PUCs are generally prohibited from retroactive rate-setting.81 
This provides a high degree of certainty to the utility and its inves-
tors once a capital expenditure is included in the utility’s rate base, 
transferring investment risk to ratepayers who will compensate the 
utility for its investment through a rate-of-return established by  
the PUC. 
III.   THE LEAST COST MANDATE AND THE  
CHANGING ELECTRICITY LANDSCAPE 
A.   The Least Cost Mandate in Action 
The following subsections explore differing approaches to the least 
cost mandate in states that have not directly altered the factors 
                                                                                                                  
 79. Other agencies at the federal or state levels may take action to incentivize or re-
quire innovation in the electricity sector. This point refers to specifically to the view of  
the PUC. 
 80. See, e.g., Age and Capacity of Operating US Coal and Gas Fired Generators, Fall 
2011, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., http://www.rmi.org/RFGraph-age_capacity_operating_US_ 
coal_gas_generators (last visited Feb. 27, 2016); Age of Electric Power Generators Varies 
Widely, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 16, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.cfm?id=1830. 
 81. See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 523 So. 2d 850, 857 (La. 
1988) (“Pervading the utility rate-making process is the fundamental rule that rates are 
exclusively prospective in application and that future rates may not be designed to recoup 
past losses.”); In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 947 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ohio 2011) 
(finding that the Ohio PUC violated both the state law and state constitution when it ap-
proved rates that allowed a regulated utility to “recoup[] losses due to past regulatory de-
lay”); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 86 P.U.R. 4th 463, 479 (Or. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 1987). 
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commissioners must address. Each case study offers competing views 
of the appropriate outcome. Three of the examples—Kentucky Power, 
Mississippi Power Company, and Duke Energy—include dissenting 
opinions that articulate reasonable alternative decision-making ap-
proaches. The fourth example—Appalachian Power Company—
focuses on a project that required approval by PSCs in Virginia and 
West Virginia, but only received partial approval from one and was 
rejected by the other. In addition to sharing the common element of 
written opinions differing from one another, the cases also include 
projects that promised environmental benefits and occurred either 
before or at the early stage of the shale gas boom when it was uncer-
tain whether the dramatic drop in natural gas prices would persist. 
Together, the examples illustrate how PUCs weigh competing varia-
bles, including cost impacts, reliability, fuel diversity, regulatory 
risk, and environmental impacts.      
 1.   Kentucky Power Example: Rejection of a Wind Energy Power 
Purchase Agreement 
A 2010 case before the Kentucky Public Service Commission (PSC) 
provides perhaps the best example of the least cost mandate in ac-
tion, as the case involved a relatively inexpensive power purchase 
agreement (PPA) for wind energy that offered the potential to hedge 
against potential federal and state regulatory developments that 
seemed likely in the near future. Despite the fact that the proposed 
PPA would result in a rate increase of less than $1 per month for the 
average residential consumer, the PPA faced opposition from the 
state’s attorney general and ultimately was denied by the state’s 
PSC.  
Kentucky Power, a subsidiary of American Electric Power that 
serves 170,000 customers in the western part of the state82 sought 
approval from the PSC to charge consumers an additional $14 million 
to cover the cost of a long-term PPA for 100 megawatts (MW) of elec-
tricity produced at a wind energy facility.83 The utility justified its 
request based on the Governor’s proposal to implement a renewable 
energy standard that would require increasing amounts of renewable 
energy as a percentage of sales, legislation introduced in the state’s 
General Assembly to mandate the use of renewable energy resources 
for generating electricity, and the enactment of renewable energy 
mandates in neighboring states. Kentucky Power argued that alt-
hough there was no renewable energy mandate in Kentucky, “once 
                                                                                                                  
 82. Regulated Utility Operations, AM. ELECTRIC POWER, http://www.aep.com/about/ 
MajorBusinesses/RegulatedUtilityOperations.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 83. Ky. Power Co., No. 2009-00545, at 1, 3 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 28, 2010). 
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such a standard is enacted, the increased demand for renewable gen-
eration will cause the prices for renewable energy to increase, mak-
ing the pending wind power contract even more economically benefi-
cial.”84 The new contract would cost an estimated $14.3–$14.5 million 
per year, resulting in an increase of $0.71 per month for the average 
residential consumer.85 In essence, Kentucky Power was proposing to 
hedge business risk by entering into a long-term contract to provide 
wind energy at a stable, competitive price. 
The Kentucky Attorney General intervened in the PSC proceeding 
and made the following arguments in opposition to the contract: 
First . . . there is currently no federal or state renewable energy 
requirement and . . . the purchase of wind power is thus a discre-
tionary expense that residential customers and industrial manu-
facturers cannot afford at this time. Second, . . . Kentucky Power 
has no need for the energy expected to be provided by the Wind 
Contract because Kentucky Power is energy long and the wind 
purchase would only exacerbate that situation. . . . Third, . . . the 
Wind Contract is not economic on a net present value basis.86 
The Attorney General also argued that the wind project was un-
likely to produce as much electricity as Kentucky Power assumed and 
that delaying the investment was prudent because improvements in 
wind turbine technology would likely result in lower costs in the  
future.87 
The PSC denied Kentucky Power’s request, agreeing with the At-
torney General that the utility did not have an immediate need for 
additional generation and “the proposed 20-year wind power contract 
has not been shown to be least-cost compared to Kentucky Power’s 
available energy sources.”88 The PSC concluded that “[i]n the absence 
of legislative certainty regarding future renewable mandates, the 
value of the proposed wind power contract is speculative. There is no 
mandate at this time for utilities in Kentucky to supply renewable 
energy.”89 
The PSC Vice Chairman dissented, arguing that the contract was 
in fact competitive, pointing out that the price Kentucky Power cur-
rently pays for purchased power is approximately $45/MWh, which is 
nearly $2 more per MWh than the proposed wind contract price of 
                                                                                                                  
 84. Id. at 2-3. 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Id.  
 87. See id. at 4. 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. Id. at 7. 
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$43/MWh.90 Additionally, the dissent argued that the utility needed 
to enter into the PPA due to the “great pressures nationally and in 
Kentucky to increase renewables. . . . As a Commissioner, I am con-
cerned that ratepayers in a state like Kentucky with no nuclear pow-
er, and little potential for in-state renewables . . . will be facing large 
rate increases.” 91  Kentucky Power’s “modest proposal would have 
guaranteed a price for 20 years for at least a small portion of Ken-
tucky Power’s generation mix and thus I believe it is in fact need-
ed.”92 Furthermore, with the federal wind energy tax credit set to ex-
pire, the dissent argued, “[I]t is unlikely that future solicitations will 
generate bids as low as this one. Thus, for all of the above-stated rea-
sons, I believe that this contract satisfies Kentucky’s least-cost  
principles.”93 
The Kentucky Power case highlights the central role that near-
terms cost impacts play in PUC proceedings, as well as the reluc-
tance on the part of commissioners and consumer advocates 94  to  
accept utility arguments for investments that may hedge against  
uncertainty and risk but result in higher rates for consumers.  
In hindsight, there are two ways of viewing the decision. From  
one perspective, subsequent developments have validated the  
PSC majority and the Attorney General. As of the time of the publi-
cation date for this Article, there is no renewable energy mandate  
in the state, the PSC has approved rate increases for Kentucky  
Power consumers even without the proposed wind energy contract,95 
                                                                                                                  
 90. Id. at 9 (Gardner, Comm’r, dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 10.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1 (showing that the Kentucky Attorney General and the trade group Ken-
tucky Industrial Utility Consumers, Inc. intervened to advocate the interests of Kentucky 
Power’s consumers).  
 95. Ronn Robinson, Kentucky Power Files to Withdraw Rate Case, AEP KY. POWER  
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.kentuckypower.com/info/news/viewRelease.aspx?releaseID=1471 
(showing an additional five percent rate increase beginning Jan. 1, 2014); Ronn Robinson, 
Public Service Commission Approves Kentucky Power Rate Case Settlement Agreement, 
AEP KY. POWER (June 28, 2010), https://www.kentuckypower.com/info/news/viewRelease. 
aspx?releaseID=872 (noting that the Kentucky PSC approved a 16.84% rate increase for 
Kentucky Power in 2010). 
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and Congress did not enact a federal cap-and-trade bill that would 
have required electricity generators to acquire emission allowances 
for each ton of CO2 emitted during a year.96 Furthermore, the cost of 
wind turbines continues to fall.97  
The positions of the electric utility and the dissenting commis-
sioner, however, argue that state law does not prohibit reasonable 
attempts to hedge risks. Post hoc evaluations may help refine the 
scope of the “least cost” framework, but the failure of risks to materi-
alize within a few years should not present a barrier to expanding 
the temporal scope of the least cost inquiry, nor should it prohibit 
consideration of regulatory risk. As a business investing in infra-
structure that will operate for multiple decades, the ability to hedge 
reasonably foreseeable risks, including fuel price volatility, regulato-
ry uncertainty, and technology uncertainty may be critical to achieve 
the interrelated goals of affordable, reliable, and clean electricity. 
This view is bolstered by PUC decisions in a neighboring state. The 
same year that the Kentucky PSC denied Kentucky Power’s request, 
the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approved a new wind en-
ergy PPA, noting the “real benefits for [the utility], its customers, and 
the State of Indiana.”98 Those benefits included “diversif[ying] [the] 
supply portfolio[,] . . . provid[ing] environmental benefits[,] . . . en-
courag[ing] the proliferation of [in-state renewable energy,] im-
prov[ing the state’s] economy[,] and . . . hedg[ing] against new envi-
ronmental emissions regulations and potential fuel cost volatility.”99 
A subsequent decision by the Kentucky PSC endorsed a similar ap-
                                                                                                                  
 96. The climate policy argument did not appear in the Kentucky Power Co. case, but 
the PSC considered the issue in a similar wind energy proceeding involving the regulated 
utilities Louisville Gas & Electric and Kentucky Utilities. Motion of Louisville Gas & Elec-
tric Co. & Kentucky Utilities Co. for a Declaratory ruling or, in the Alternative, for Waiver 
of Certain Filing Requirements at 4 n.3, Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. & Ky. Utils. Co., No. 
2009-00353 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 28, 2009) (citing federal legislative proposals to 
limit CO2 emissions among the justifications for approval to charge consumers for a power 
purchase agreement for wind energy without a full PSC hearing). Ultimately, the PSC 
denied the waiver request to permit the utilities to recover the cost of a wind energy power 
purchase agreement without a formal PSC proceeding. Order at 8, Louisville Gas & Elec. 
Co. & Ky. Utils. Co., No. 2009-00353 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 21, 2009).   
 97. See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, Solar and Wind Energy Start to Win on Price vs. 
Conventional Fuels, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/ 
business/energy-environment/solar-and-wind-energy-start-to-win-on-price-vs-conventional-
fuels.html?_r=0 (referring to “recent analyses [that] show that even without those subsi-
dies, alternative energies can often compete with traditional sources”). 
 98. Ind. Mich. Power Co., No. 43750, 2010 WL 127594 (Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n Jan. 6, 
2010) (citing So. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., No. 43635, at 8-10 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n 
June 17, 2009)); Indianapolis Power & Light Co., No. 43485 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n 
Oct. 1, 2008); Ind. Mich. Power Co., No. 43328 (Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n Nov. 28, 
2007).  
 99. Ind. Mich. Power, 2010 WL 127594 (second alteration in original) (citation  
omitted). 
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proach to the costs and benefits associated with renewable energy 
when it departed from its strict adherence to the least cost analysis 
in a case involving a new biomass-fired electricity generating unit.100 
Noting the benefits of innovative energy projects to the local econo-
my, the state’s renewable energy goals that included biomass, and 
the project’s ability to replace a portion of electricity from a retiring 
coal-fired power plant, the PSC approved the project.101 
 2.   Duke Energy Example: Approval of a New Coal-Fired  
Power Plant 
In 2007, the North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) consid-
ered a proposal by Duke Energy Carolinas to construct two new 800 
MW coal-fired units at its existing Cliffside Steam Station near Char-
lotte, North Carolina.102 After testing a number of scenarios through 
its long-range resource planning, Duke Energy had determined that 
the new coal-fired units were the best option for meeting baseload 
electricity demand.103 The utility reached this conclusion despite cur-
rent factors suggesting the likelihood that the new facility would face 
limitations on greenhouse gas emissions through federal climate leg-
islation or through regulations issued pursuant to the existing Clean 
Air Act.104 The planning process examined six scenarios that included 
                                                                                                                  
 100. Kentucky Sidesteps Least-Cost Principles to Approve New PPA, 4143 PUR UTIL. 
REG. NEWS 1 (Oct. 25, 2013). 
 101. Ky. Power Co., No. 2013-00144 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 10, 2013). 
 102. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 257 P.U.R. 4th 115 (N.C. Util. Comm’n Mar. 21, 
2007), 2007 WL 1040917. 
 103. Id.  
 104. In 2007, the U.S. Senate was debating the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security 
Act that, if enacted, would have created a descending cap on greenhouse gas emissions 
from the power sector, transportation sector, and industrial sector. S. 2191, 110th Cong. 
(2007). The same year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that greenhouse gas emissions met 
the definition of “pollutant” under the Clean Air Act, thereby requiring the U.S. EPA to 
determine whether the pollutants emitted from motor vehicles endangered public health 
and welfare. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007). The EPA subsequently 
made such a finding, resulting in regulations not only limiting CO2 emission limits from 
motor vehicles, but also from the power sector and other stationary sources. See, e.g., En-
dangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2015)); 
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 (2015) (originally published as 2017 and Later Model Year Light-
Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 
77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012)); 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71 (2015) (originally pub-
lished as Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010)); 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86 (2015); 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 
531, 533, 536, 537 (2015) (originally published as 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty 
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 
Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012)); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Sta-
tionary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
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varying amounts of new coal, natural gas, nuclear, and renewable 
generation. The NCUC considered various alternatives for meeting 
some or all of the projected near-term demand needs, including in-
vestments in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and an integrated 
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant. 105  Energy efficiency and 
renewable energy were seen as ineffective in meeting the level of pro-
jected demand growth, and the IGCC technology was considered 
risky, too time-intensive, and more costly than the pulverized  
coal option.106    
The commission approved one of the two proposed 800 MW units. 
The NCUC’s decision turned primarily on two factors: (1) the per-
ceived need for additional baseload generation by 2011 and (2) con-
cerns about overreliance on natural gas and the fact that at the time 
natural gas was not used to provide baseload power.107 The dissent 
argued that coal was not a prudent option for new generation, citing 
the provision in the NC Public Utilities Act requiring the commission 
to “encourage and promote harmony between public utilities, their 
users and the environment.”108 This provision, the dissent claimed, is 
not subservient to other NCUC duties.109  
The NCUC decision prioritizes timing and fuel mix diversity over 
environmental considerations. Although the dissent did not persuade 
the commission that it must give equal weight to environmental con-
siderations, the language in the Public Utilities Act arguably would 
allow commissioners to more fully incorporate potential environmen-
tal impacts into the NCUC decision-making process. Even without 
reliance on that provision, decisions regarding coal-fired power plants 
in other states demonstrate that commissions can reasonably consid-
er environmental impacts and give more weight to alternative forms 
of energy. Commissions in Florida, Oklahoma, and Oregon rejected 
utility plans to build new coal-fired power plants due to concerns 
about future climate policy compliance costs and failures to ade-
quately consider alternative energy options.110  
                                                                                                                  
from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98). 
 105. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917. An IGCC facility converts coal into a 
synthetic gas before generating electricity via a gas turbine and a steam turbine. See How 
IGCC Works, DUKE ENERGY, http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/how-igcc-works.asp 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
 106. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Public Utilities Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(5) (2014); accord Duke Energy Caroli-
nas, 2007 WL 1040917 (Owens, Jr., Comm’r, dissenting).  
 109. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917. 
 110. See Fla. Power & Light Co., No. 070098-EI, at 4 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n July 2, 
2007), http://www.psc.state.fl.us/library/filings/07/05350-07/07-0557.ord.doc (finding that 
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The Cliffside decision111 demonstrates the limitations of modeling 
and the importance of a robust assessment of options. In addition to 
the congressional debate over federal climate policy that was under-
way at the time of the NCUC’s Cliffside decision, the rapid change in 
circumstances following the decision calls into question the wisdom of 
approving a $1.8 billion112 facility expected to operate for 40 years or 
more with known public health impacts and uncertain regulatory 
risks. Only four years after the decision, and one year before the new 
Cliffside unit became operational, Duke Energy was relying on natu-
ral gas units as baseload power, and energy projects suggest that 
natural gas prices will remain relatively stable for the foreseeable 
future.113 And only seven years after the Cliffside decision, Duke En-
ergy raised concerns about the proposed Clean Power Plan limiting 
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants pursuant to sec-
tion 111(d) of the Clean Air Act because it would cause “many [elec-
tricity generating unit] owners and operators to abandon or signifi-
cantly curtail operation of generating units where significant invest-
ments have been made to install state-of-the-art control systems to 
meet MATS and other air regulations.”114 The concerns about the 
proposed rule creating stranded assets demonstrates the circular 
reasoning that may result from a narrow view of the least cost 
framework—investment decisions that fail to adequately account for 
reasonably foreseeable changes in air quality regulations may lock in 
higher emissions, thereby exacerbating air quality issues that result 
in regulatory changes while also making the regulatory changes more 
expensive than they may have been otherwise. As Duke Energy notes 
in its comments, costs associated with stranded assets “are typically 
                                                                                                                  
the proposed coal-fired power plant was not the least cost resource due to future costs asso-
ciated with CO2 emissions); Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., No. PUD 200800059 (Okla. Corp. 
Comm’n June 9, 2008); Pacificorp, Order No. 07-018 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm’n Jan. 16, 
2007), http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/2007ords/07-018.pdf. For more detail on these and 
other examples of state and local agencies rejecting coal-fired power plants, see Patrick 
Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change with 
Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 1462-63 (2008). 
 111. Duke Energy Carolinas, 2007 WL 1040917. 
 112. Project Overview, DUKE ENERGY, http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/cliffside-
overview.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
 113. DUKE ENERGY IRP 2012, supra note 55, at 7-10; Environmental Performance  
Metrics, DUKE ENERGY, http://sustainabilityreport.duke-energy.com/2011/environmental-
footprint/environmental-performance-metrics/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (showing in the 
Table titled “Fuels Consumed for U.S. Electric Generation” that in 2011 coal consumption 
decreased while natural gas consumption increased). 
 114. Duke Energy, Comments on the Proposed Rule on Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 
34,830, at 197 (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/Duke-Energy-
Comments_12.01.14.pdf. 
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borne by customers in accordance with rates approved by state regu-
latory commissions,” a particular concern for the NCUC.115  
 3.   Mississippi Power Example: Approval of Retrofitting Existing 
Coal-Fired Units to Comply with New Environmental  
Regulations 
The federal Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (Utility MATS), 
promulgated December 2011 pursuant to section 112 of the Clean Air 
Act,116 forced many utilities operating older coal-fired power plants to 
decide whether to undertake large capital investments to bring exist-
ing coal units into compliance with the Act or to retire the facilities 
and replace generation needs with natural gas.117 In 2012, the Mis-
sissippi PSC faced this circumstance when it considered Mississippi 
Power’s proposed $660 million retrofit at the Victor J. Daniel Electric 
Generating Facility (“Plant Daniel”) in Jackson County, Mississip-
pi.118 Plant Daniel consists of “two coal units (Units 1 and 2) that 
combined are capable of generating approximately 1,020 MW (net 
summer peak) of electricity, and two natural gas-fired combined cycle 
units (Units 3 and 4) that combined are capable of generating ap-
proximately 1,054 MW (net summer peak) of electricity.”119 The PSC 
inquiry focused on Units 1 and 2, the newest units in Mississippi 
Power’s fleet at the time.120  
Mississippi Power acknowledged that additional environmental 
regulations were forthcoming, and those regulations would affect the 
                                                                                                                  
 115. Id. 
 116. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-
Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial- Institutional, and Small Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63 (2015)) [hereinafter Utility MATS]. In 2015, the U.S. Su-
preme Court determined that the EPA’s failure to consider the compliance costs associated 
with limiting mercury emissions from the electric power sector was unreasonable. Michi-
gan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). At the time of publication, the D.C. Circuit had not 
decided whether to overturn the Utility MATS rule or keep the rule in place while the EPA 
revised its justification for promulgating the regulation. Because this Article relies on Util-
ity MATS as a means of examining PUC decision-making, the outcome of the Utility MATS 
rule does not affect the analysis herein. 
 117. See, e.g., Ky. Power Co., No. 2013-00430, 316 P.U.R. 4th 92 (Ky. P.S.C, Aug. 1, 
2014), 2014 WL 3867888 (approving replacing one coal-fired unit with a natural gas tur-
bine); Ky. Power Co., No. 2012-00578, 2013 WL 5592919, at *15 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
Oct. 7, 2013) (finding that retrofitting a 1078 MW coal-fired unit to comply with new envi-
ronmental regulations “is not the lowest cost option”); Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012 
WL 1484068 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 3, 2012) (final certificate order). 
 118. Miss. Power Co., 2012 WL 1484068, at *5.  
 119. Id. at *4. 
 120. Id. (noting that Units 1 and 2 began operating in 1977 and 1981, respectively).  
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operation of Plant Daniel’s coal-fired units. The PSC responded by 
noting, “[B]ecause of the uncertainty concerning the exact require-
ments and timing of several impending regulations, the final combi-
nation of control technologies that will be needed in addition to the 
Scrubber Project cannot be finalized at this time.”121 Mississippi Pow-
er informed the commission that the scrubbers must be installed pri-
or to any additional environmental controls that may ultimately be 
required at Plant Daniel.122 The Company expected to file for a sepa-
rate certificate for additional controls once more information became 
available concerning the other potential environmental controls that 
may be required for continued operation of the coal-fired units. Ra-
ther than hedging against the potential for future CO2 emission lim-
its, Mississippi Power argued that investing in Plant Daniel to com-
ply with Utility MATS would “allow the Company to mitigate the risk 
to the existing fleet of future CO2 compliance cost by allowing addi-
tional time for greater certainty about CO2 regulations before com-
mitting to expensive environmental controls on the remainder of  
the fleet.”123 
The commission relied on the utility’s economic modeling demon-
strating that the retrofit option was the most cost-effective, finding 
that additional modeling by the Mississippi Public Utilities Staff to 
evaluate the decision under different future fuel price and policy sce-
narios was inconclusive.124 The commission also considered fuel di-
versity, noting that opting to retire the units rather than retrofit 
them would result in natural gas making up seventy-one percent of 
the utility’s energy mix. 125  In the end, the PSC placed “superior 
weight” on the retrofit option’s benefits regarding fuel diversity and 
fuel security and determined that high CO2 prices are not likely.126  
A dissenting commissioner argued that retrofitting the units was 
the wrong decision, questioning the concerns about overreliance on 
natural gas and the hedging strategies of the firm.127 The dissent as-
serted that Mississippi Power’s analysis of its options was “based on 
                                                                                                                  
 121. Id. at *6. 
 122. Id. (“The Company expects to file for a separate certificate for additional controls 
once more information is available concerning the other potential environmental controls 
that may be required for continued operation of Units 1 and 2 at Plant Daniel.”). 
 123. Id. at *8. 
 124. Id. at *7-8. 
 125. Id. at *7 (finding “the strategic interest of fuel diversity very compelling and gives 
significant weight to this consideration”). 
 126. Id. at *9. 
 127. Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484069 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 4, 
2012) (Presley, Comm’r, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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severe overestimations of future natural gas prices which naturally 
favored installation of scrubbers at Daniel.” 128  According to the  
dissent: 
The primary strategic argument for the scrubbers is that the re-
tention of coal in [Mississippi Power’s] fuel mix achieves fuel di-
versity as protection from natural gas price volatility. As pointed 
out in the record, this again misstates a key issue. While diversity 
of generation is obviously important, its value is as a hedge 
against skyrocketing natural gas prices where the only alternative 
is natural gas fired generation. With the realization of gas prices 
as high as [Mississippi Power] predicts unlikely, and with a stable 
of alternatives as discussed above, the value of this hedging com-
ponent diminishes. It diminishes so much, in fact, that the capital 
investment required to achieve diversity will eclipse any costs this 
diversity has avoided. 
 Finally, [Mississippi Power] argues that the Daniel Units 1 and 
2 must be retained as necessary baseload units. However, the term 
“baseload unit” is not synonymous with “coal-fired unit.” When 
economics dictate, natural gas units can serve as baseload re-
sources. In fact, Plant Daniel itself demonstrates this as its gas 
units have provided baseload power over the last two years where 
the coal units have not.129 
The dissent also criticized the notion that investing in the $660 
million scrubbers “pre-certif[ied] future ratepayer investment in the 
company and . . . continue[d] to put the Commission in a box” by  
admitting:  
[T]he scrubbers will be the first in a series of capital intensive en-
vironmental compliance requirements for Daniel Units 1 & 2 if 
they are to continue operation. . . .  
 The conclusion that the public interest is only satisfied by ap-
proving the Daniel Scrubbers is based on false economic and stra-
tegic premises that misguided the debate. The decision in this case 
followed a trail of logic that was off target from the start. There-
fore, the Commission arrived at the wrong destination. In convinc-
ing the majority that this path was correct, MPC has successfully 
set up another Kemper situation in which this or future Commis-
sions will be forced to choose between allowing a “too big to fail” fi-
nancial disaster for one of its utilities or placing the burden of its 
rescue on utility customers.130 
                                                                                                                  
 128. Id. at *1 (relying on data from U.S. EIA and NYMEX). 
 129. Id. at *2.  
 130. Id. at *3. 
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The majority and dissenting opinions provide a stark contract 
when considering the bounds of prudency and least cost in a PSC 
proceeding. By noting the likelihood of more stringent environmental 
regulations in the future, the commission’s majority considered least 
cost over time rather than taking a static view of least cost based on 
the laws and regulations in place at the time. However, the PSC did 
not engage in robust analysis of the future costs, instead relying on 
assertions by Mississippi Power. At the same time, the commission 
also noted the option’s value of investing in the scrubbers in the near-
term as a strategy to preserve options in the future.131 In contrast, 
the dissent placed more faith in natural gas prices remaining rela-
tively low and thus dismissed concerns about maintaining fuel diver-
sity. By criticizing Mississippi Power’s acceptance of additional costs 
arising from future environmental regulations, the dissent also im-
plicitly argued for hedging regulatory risk by choosing an option that 
is more likely to avoid future costs. 
 4.   Appalachian Power Company Example: Rejection of a New 
IGCC Plant 
A 2007 proposal by Appalachian Power Company (APCo), an 
American Electric Power (AEP) subsidiary, to construct a coal-fired 
IGCC plant provides a further look at different interpretations of the 
least cost mandate. APCo, whose service territory spans portions of 
West Virginia and Virginia, proposed construction a 629 MW coal-
fired IGCC facility in West Virginia.132 The utility justified its pro-
posal based on the potential to capture carbon emissions in the event 
the U.S. Congress adopted new legislation requiring emission de-
creases.133 The project required separate approval from the commis-
sion in each state before moving forward with the $2.23 billion pro-
ject, but it only received approval from the West Virginia PSC.134 The 
Virginia State Corporation Commission (SCC) denied APCo’s bid for 
approval, preventing the project from moving forward.135 
                                                                                                                  
 131. Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484068, at *8 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
Apr. 3, 2012); see infra Section III.B for further discussion of options value. 
 132. Appalachian Power Co., No. PUE-2007-00068, 2008 S.C.C. Ann Rept. 405 (Va. 
State Corp. Comm’n Apr. 14, 2008), 2008 WL 1778119 (final order); Appalachian Power 
Co., No. 06-0033-E-CN, at 1 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 6, 2008) (comm’n order). 
 133. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1778119, at *3. 
 134. Appalachian Power Co., 263 P.U.R. 4th 297 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Mar. 6, 
2008), 2008 WL 1758812. 
 135. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1778119, at *2 (denying APCo’s application for a 
rate adjustment clause). The project would cost 40–105% more than a similar size pulver-
ized coal facility. Id. at *3. APCo’s filings indicated that the firm planned to seek federal 
funding to cover a portion of the construction costs. Id.; see Appalachian Power Fact Sheet: 
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, CARBON CAPTURE & SEQUESTRATION TECHS. 
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Despite the project’s cost, the West Virginia Commission was per-
suaded in part because it would  
enable APCo to continue to use native coal for the Project’s ex-
pected life in a way that will provide superior thermal efficiency, 
will enable APCo to achieve significant reductions over the envi-
ronmental impacts of the conventional coal combustion and will fa-
cilitate compliance with the constraints imposed by expected fu-
ture environmental regulations.136  
After accounting for the cost of future environmental regulations, 
the PSC found that the cost of electricity from the IGCC plant would 
be less than that from a new pulverized coal unit.137 
The Virginia SCC came to the opposite conclusion from its coun-
terpart in West Virginia, finding that the IGCC facility was “neither 
reasonable nor prudent.”138 The SCC questioned the viability of the 
technology and the accuracy of the cost projections.139 The commis-
sion also dismissed the regulatory hedging value of the new plant 
because future CO2 emission limits were too uncertain.140  
Similar to the KY Power and Mississippi Power examples, the 
Virginia and West Virginia Commissions offer opposing views of reg-
ulatory risk and the degree of certainty necessary to justify rate in-
creases. The APCo IGCC case also provides an example of the direct 
relationship between the views of commissioners and deployment of 
new energy technologies, as well as the challenge of deploying tech-
nologies that may present diffuse societal benefits but high  
localized costs.141 
The group of PUC cases described in this subpart highlight the 
predominant role that near-term cost considerations play in a PUC 
proceeding, despite the fact that the dissenting opinions in the Ken-
tucky Power, Duke Energy, and Mississippi Power examples and the 
different approaches of the two state commissions in the APCo ex-
ample suggest that alternative views were possible under the respec-
tive state laws. Taken together, the cases demonstrate conflicting 
views of costs, risks, and benefits that may arise in a least cost in-
quiry and the subjectivity inherent in PUC decision-making. The 
                                                                                                                  
@ MIT, http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/appalachian_power.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016).  
 136. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1758812. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Appalachian Power Co., 2008 WL 1778119, at *2. 
 139. Id. at *3-6. 
 140. Id. at *7-8.  
 141. Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy Innovation Cycle: The 
View from the Public Utility Commission, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 1381-83 (2014). 
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cases also demonstrate that choices regarding which variables to con-
sider and how much weight to give each variable have a direct influ-
ence on the outcome. Each example reveals that reasonable commis-
sioners may disagree regarding which risks to consider, how those 
risks relate to one another, and which alternatives are viable choices 
for the regulated utilities. These cases also highlight the difficulty of 
assessing and responding to policy uncertainty, leading many com-
missions to evaluate utility needs based on laws on the books at  
the time.  
B.   Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and Inherent Value Choices 
The U.S. electricity sector is in the early phase of a major and 
costly transition that will ultimately result in the replacement of 
much of the nation’s electricity infrastructure by the middle of the 
twenty-first century, including replacing the fleet of existing power 
plants, further incorporating renewable energy technologies, and 
transitioning the electricity grid to a digital system.142 The resulting 
capital costs and projected minimal electricity demand growth during 
this time creates the potential for significant cost increases in elec-
tricity rates.143 While the transition will occur over a period of dec-
ades, a series of near-term factors will directly affect private sector 
investments and the sector’s long-term emissions trajectory, includ-
ing fuel prices, technology advancements, and regulatory require-
ments. PUCs will play a central role in managing this transition.  
Electricity markets were relatively predictable from the early-to-
mid 1980s until recently. Coal prices were generally stable, while 
natural gas prices were characterized by wide price swings in the 
1990s and early 2000s.144 Electricity generation options were limited, 
with pulverized coal plants and nuclear plants offering viable options 
for dependable, affordable baseload power.145 Natural gas turbines 
                                                                                                                  
 142. See, e.g., JONAS MONAST & DAVID HOPPOCK, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY 
SOLS., DUKE UNIV., DESIGNING CO2 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR A TRANSITIONING 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR: A MULTI-BENEFITS FRAMEWORK 11068 (2014); THE FUTURE OF THE 
ELECTRIC GRID: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY (2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/ 
files/Electric_Grid_Full_Report.pdf. 
 143. Annual Energy Outlook 2015: Executive Summary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/executive_summary.cfm (“Rising costs for 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution, coupled with relatively slow 
growth of electricity demand, produce an 18% increase in the average retail price of elec-
tricity over the period from 2013 to 2040 in the AEO2015 Reference case.”). 
 144. Table 7.9 Coal Prices, Selected Years, 1949-2011, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(2011), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/sec7_21.pdf; U.S. Natural Gas 
Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ 
hist/n9190us3m.htm.  
 145. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2040, at IF-34 (2014), www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo14/pdf/0383(2014).pdf (finding that 
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and oil-fired boilers provided intermediate and peak power due to 
their ability to ramp up or down based on electricity demand and the 
higher fuel costs.146 Solar and wind power were unable to compete on 
a cost basis and relied on subsidies and mandates.147 Existing power 
plants were exempt from many of the new environmental regulations 
that emerged in the early 1970s.148 Electricity demand was generally 
predictable, with the notable exception of the decline in demand in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s.149 This drop in demand, due to an 
economic recession and the difficulties utilities encountered with fi-
nancing and permitting of nuclear power plants in the aftermath of 
the Three Mile Island accident, led to cancelled projects that resulted 
in over $15 billion in stranded costs that were largely borne by  
ratepayers.150  
A range of economic, technical, and regulatory factors are driving 
profound shifts in the U.S. electricity sector, creating a complex ma-
trix of risks that electric generators and regulators must understand 
and address. For example, the shale gas boom has led to a rapid drop 
in natural gas prices, and current projections from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration and NYMEX futures prices suggest that 
the average price per mmBtu could remain relatively stable for at 
least a decade or more.151 In the near term, the low fuel cost makes 
                                                                                                                  
“[i]n 2012, coal-fired and nuclear power plants together provided 56% of the electricity 
generated in the United States” and noting that nuclear and coal operate as baseload  
power). 
 146. See Natural Gas-Fired Combustion Turbines Are Generally Used to Meet Peak 
Electricity Load, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13191.  
 147. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2030, at 70 (2008), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383%282008%29.pdf 
(noting that the modeling reference case projects “the growth potential of wind power, 
which depends on a variety of factors, including fossil fuel costs, State renewable energy 
programs, technology improvements, access to transmission grids, public concerns about 
environmental and other impacts, and the future of the Federal PTC [(Production Tax 
Credit)]” and that “[s]olar technologies in general remain too costly for grid-connected  
applications, but demonstration programs and State policies support some growth in cen-
tral-station solar PV, and small-scale customer-sited PV applications grow rapidly”).  
 148. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmen-
tal Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 
1681-96 (2007). 
 149. Pierce, supra note 26, at 502-03. 
 150. See Joseph P. Tomain & Constance Dowd Burton, Nuclear Transition: From Three 
Mile Island to Chernobyl, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1987) (citing ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS, AND 
CONSEQUENCES ch. 2 (1983)). 
 151. See Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Settlements, CME GROUP, 
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/natural-gas/natural-gas_quotes_settlements_ 
futures.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (showing natural gas futures prices settling at, 
$2.654 for Sept. 2020 futures and $2.916 for Dec. 2027 futures); see also Natural Gas Con-
sumption Has Two Peaks Each Year, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 1, 2011), 
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natural gas a likely option for new electricity generation.152 However, 
because it is early in the shale gas boom, long-term price projections 
may be inaccurate. Historically, natural gas has displayed significant 
price volatility, and long-term price projections have been frequently 
proven unreliable.153 Because the levelized operating cost for a natu-
ral gas plant is largely determined by fuel costs, as opposed to a coal 
plant or a nuclear plant where the cost is largely driven by construc-
tion costs, volatility in natural gas prices over the lifetime of a facility 
could result in significant rate spikes in areas with growing reliance 
on natural gas generation.154  
Despite the prospect of long-term natural gas price volatility, new 
coal-fired generation in the United States is unlikely. Even before the 
rapid expansion of shale gas production and the resulting drop in 
natural gas prices, energy projections suggested that there would be 
little or no new coal-fired generation built in the foreseeable future,155 
with any increases in coal-fired generation resulting from increased 
dispatch from existing units. Coal’s competitive advantage compared 
to natural gas was a result of the fuel price being relatively cheap 
and stable, a competitive advantage that is undermined by the dra-
matic increase of economically viable natural gas reserves in the 
United States due to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
technologies.156 The shift from higher average prices to lower average 
prices puts the cost of generating electricity from a natural gas-fired 
facility on par with that of a coal-fired facility.157 The increasing costs 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2050 (showing cyclical increases in NYMEX 
futures prices are due to increased winter demand).  
 152. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 
2040, at 8-9 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383%282015%29.pdf. 
 153. The rapid emergence of economically viable shale gas resources may limit price 
volatility moving forward. See, e.g., Natural Gas Prices Drop Following Strong Production 
Growth, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.cfm?id=19751; U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/archive/2013/index.cfm (last up-
dated Dec. 19, 2014) (finding that “[a] sharp increase in proved natural gas reserves in 
2013 more than offset the significant decline experienced in 2012, and set a new record 
(354 trillion cubic feet) for U.S. natural gas proved reserves”) (footnote omitted). 
 154. See Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the 
Annual Energy Outlook 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm [hereinafter Levelized Cost].  
 155. See Steve James, Feature-US Coal-Fired Power Plant Plans up in Smoke? 
REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/04/coal-power-
idUSN0232700720070304.  
 156. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 39-42, 79 (2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/aeo13/pdf/ 
0383%282013%29.pdf. 
 157. Electric Generator Dispatch Depends on System Demand and the Relative Cost of 
Operation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.cfm?id=7590. 
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of operating coal-fired power plants and the prospect of increasing 
stringency on emissions of CO2 and other air pollutants not only 
make new coal-fired generation unlikely, these factors also raise 
questions about the viability of the nation’s existing fleet of coal-fired 
power plants. 
Uncertainty regarding the nation’s existing fleet of nuclear power 
plants highlights the emergence of yet another vexing issue facing 
electric utilities and their regulators. The operating permits for the 
majority of the nation’s nuclear power plants will expire in the 
2030s,158 forcing utilities and regulators to decide between seeking 
permit extensions and retiring facilities before plants reach the end 
of their operating license.159  With the average ten to twelve year 
planning horizon to construct a new nuclear plant, operators and 
regulators will need to determine whether to replace facilities with 
new nuclear generation before the end of the decade. Factors such as 
natural gas prices, climate policy, uncertainty regarding electricity 
demand growth, and concerns about price volatility and fuel diversity 
will play important roles in the decision-making process.  
The electricity sector will face increased infrastructure expendi-
tures independent of generation decisions in order to respond to the 
need for new transmission lines and smart grid improvements.160 If 
electricity demand remains stagnant, utilities will likely have to 
raise rates in order to recover the costs of new infrastructure, poten-
tially further depressing demand. Flat demand can also raise ques-
tions regarding whether to undertake major capital projects because 
there may not be the need for the capacity once the facility is com-
pleted, potentially resulting in underutilized or stranded assets and 
consumers paying higher prices to compensate the utilities for poor 
                                                                                                                  
 158. See Almost All U.S. Nuclear Plants Require Life Extension Past 60 Years to Oper-
ate Beyond 2050, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/ 
detail.cfm?id=19091(explaining that the bulk of existing nuclear power plants were li-
censed before 1990 and that an operating license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) is good for a period of forty years). 
 159. Many of these nuclear units have already received one license extension from the 
NRC. Id. (noting that the NRC has granted twenty-year license renewals to 74 out of the 
100 operating reactors in the United States).  
 160. For example, the Brattle Group has estimated that the sector will spend between 
$120–$160 billion per decade on new transmission through 2030. JOHANNES 
PFEIFENBERGER ET AL., THE BRATTLE GROUP, INVESTMENT TRENDS AND FUNDAMENTALS IN 
US TRANSMISSION AND ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 11 (2015), http://www.brattle.com/ 
system/news/pdfs/000/000/904/original/Investment_Trends_and_Fundamentals_in_US_ 
Transmission_and_Electricity_Infrastructure.pdf?1437424727. A 2012 Deloitte report es-
timates that investments in new electricity generation will reach $150 billion in the same 
time period, while smart grid investments between 2012–2015 could amount to $4.4–$11.6 
billion. GREGORY ALIFF, DELOITTE, THE MATH DOES NOT LIE: FACTORING THE FUTURE OF 
THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 4 (2012), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ 
global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/dttl-er-themathdoesnotlie-08082013.pdf.  
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planning decisions. The history of unfinished nuclear power plants in 
the aftermath of the 1970s recession and the Three Mile Island nu-
clear disaster offer a cautionary tale for regulators considering large 
capital expenditures during a period of significant uncertainty.161   
However, a decision-maker cannot freeze in the face of uncertain-
ty. Investments must be made to maintain reliable electricity service. 
How to do so, what costs are incurred by various options, and who 
pays those costs all raise unavoidable value choices. The strategies by 
which electric utilities and their regulators address these uncertain-
ties will determine the trajectory of electricity rates and the sector’s 
environmental impacts for decades to come.  
Uncertainty is not a new challenge for the electricity sector, as 
utility executives and regulators have long had to grapple with the 
prospect of changes in technology, fuel prices, and regulation. How-
ever, the scope and scale of uncertainties, and the fact that these fac-
tors are converging at the same time that utilities are retiring large 
numbers of older coal-fired power plants and determining whether 
and how to replace the retiring generation, present a particularly 
challenging decision-making environment for current PUCs. 
Compounding the challenges associated with regulatory decision-
making in the face of uncertainty is the fact that capital investments 
for generation decisions are irreversible.162 The current U.S. electrici-
ty infrastructure primarily depends upon large power plants to gen-
erate electricity. Initial capital investments can range from approxi-
mately $1000–$1400 per kilowatt for new natural gas combined cycle 
units, and approximately $2800–$5700 per kilowatt for a new nucle-
ar unit.163 Once those investments are made, either the shareholders 
or ratepayers must pay.164 Risk allocation is a key difference between 
a typical investment by a corporate actor facing market competition 
and an investment by a rate-regulated electric utility. Once a PUC 
                                                                                                                  
 161. See Pierce, supra note 26, at 504-05. 
 162. See, e.g., Miss. Power Co., 2010UA279, 2012 WL 1484068, at *8 (Miss. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n Apr. 3, 2012) (final certificate order) (noting that installing a scrubber to comply 
with Utility MATS “was largely ‘irreversible,’ because a decision to control would dictate 
that future environmental controls be added and, further, because Daniel is the newest 
coal units, a decision not to control would likely lead to similar decisions with respect to the 
remaining coal units in [Mississippi Power’s] fleet”). 
 163. KAPLAN, supra note 73, at 79-83 (listing project costs for proposed and completed 
nuclear and natural gas combined cycle projects). The text uses price-per-kilowatt to pro-
vide a common unit for comparison due to variation in the size of projects. See id. The total 
project costs range from $330 million to $9.9 billion, with net summer capacity ranging 
from 300 to 2700 megawatts. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 730 
F.2d 816 (1984) (considering how to allocate costs incurred for a nuclear unit that did not 
become operational). 
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incorporates a utility investment into the rate base, the commission 
must set rates at a level that allows the utility’s investors to recoup 
their investments plus a rate of return.165  
The combination of uncertainty and irreversibility are distinctive 
risks facing commissioners overseeing rate-regulated industries, such 
as vertically-regulated electric utilities.166 At the same time, the lati-
tude available to utility commissioners creates an opportunity to ad-
dress a wide range of societal impacts resulting from electricity gen-
eration. Conversely, failure to take an expansive view of the factors 
that contribute to long-term costs associated with operating various 
types of power plants could result in the PUCs failing to achieve the 
least cost mandate that underlies so much of their decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, rigid adherence to the narrow view of con-
strained least cost could frustrate the tripartite aims of affordability, 
reliability, and allowing reasonable returns on investment. 
IV.   MAXIMIZING UTILITY THROUGH THE LEAST COST  
FRAMEWORK: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE  
The premise that PUC decision-making is, at its core, an attempt 
at maximizing societal utility calls for a critical assessment of the 
scope of the regulatory process. Whose utility is the regulatory pro-
cess attempting to maximize, and relatedly, is the goal overall utility 
or utility among a narrow band of criteria? The impacts of an electric 
utility’s decision may be felt across a utility’s service territory, a 
state, a region, the nation, or the globe. For example, reliance on 
cheap electricity from coal throughout the twentieth century resulted 
in high levels of mercury emissions, which are known to cause severe 
neurological impacts; sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions, 
which are known to contribute to respiratory problems and to be the 
leading cause of acid rain;167 and greenhouse gas emissions,168 which 
are known contributors to global climate change.169 These impacts not 
                                                                                                                  
 165. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923). 
 166. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 842-43 
(2006). 
 167. See Health, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/ 
sulfurdioxide/health.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016); What is Acid Rain?, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/acidrain/what/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
 168. See generally U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report: 1990–2013, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (providing an overview of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. 
and sources of greenhouse gas emissions). 
 169. Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/science/causes.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2015); INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 44-47, 
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only affect public health and the environment, but also may lead to 
more stringent regulations to reduce the impacts and therefore high-
er compliance costs for facilities emitting these pollutants. The finan-
cial impacts may also ripple well beyond the rates charged to con-
sumers, potentially affecting a region’s ability to attract new busi-
nesses as well as the value of retirement funds that are invested 
heavily in investor-owned utilities (IOUs) based on the expectation 
that these IOUs provide reliable returns. 
Reasonable and responsible risk hedging can mitigate the poten-
tial for significant rate increases resulting from future regulations 
and fuel price volatility, while also reducing near-term public health 
and environmental impacts. Conversely, failure to fully consider the 
risk of changing circumstances affecting generation costs can have 
serious negative economic and environmental impacts. Depending on 
the factors commissions consider and the weight assigned to each fac-
tor, they may conclude that new generation is necessary and that 
higher or lower cost alternatives are more appropriate to meet de-
mand and satisfy other important variables. Alternatively, commis-
sions may conclude that the preferable action is to delay a major in-
vestment by reducing demand through energy efficiency or demand 
response. Investing in smaller scale generation options in the near-
term may also provide an attractive option in some situations, as the 
approach may allow commissions to wait for more data to become 
available regarding the trajectory of natural gas prices or allow new 
technologies such as utility-scale energy storage options time to de-
velop.170 An option that often is not available to the PUC is simply 
refusing to make a decision, requiring the commission to rely upon 
the best information available at the time.  
The following Sections describe three options for expanding the 
scope of utility planning and utility commission oversight by pursu-
ing a “minimum regret” strategy through a robust assessment of po-
tential future scenarios affecting the electric utility sector; seeking 
options that result in multiple benefits for the electricity sector, its 
stakeholders, and society as a whole; and shifting a higher degree of 
risk to utility investors to further motivate risk hedging by the firms.  
                                                                                                                  
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_All_Topics.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 170. See David Hoppock & Dalia Patino Echeverri, Using Energy Efficiency to Hedge 
Natural Gas Price Uncertainty, NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS (2013), 
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_wp_13-02.pdf.  
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A.   Maximizing Utility by Minimizing Regret 
The range of scenarios considered and the assumptions regarding 
future electricity demand, technology, fuel prices, and regulation will 
directly influence the outcome of a PUC proceeding. Given the ram-
pant uncertainties currently facing the electricity sector, there is an 
increased likelihood that PUC decisions could result in higher costs 
over the lifetime of a facility due to retrofits to comply with new regu-
latory requirements, stranded costs due to early retirement of a facil-
ity, or both. Near-term decisions based on current technologies may 
also fail to take advantage of lower cost alternatives that emerge over 
time. Explicitly assessing how alternatives compare on multiple ob-
jectives could help utilities and regulators identify investment alter-
natives on both cost and non-cost objectives that are likely to result 
in the broadest range of societal benefits.171 Increasing transparency 
regarding the value choices inherent in the planning process can elu-
cidate those inherent choices and also demonstrate the breadth of 
options available under the least cost framework.  
The integrated resource plan (IRP) process, implemented in ap-
proximately half of the states, is perhaps the most direct attempt at a 
utility maximization approach. IRPs generally require electric utili-
ties to explain to the PUC how they expect the electricity sector to 
change over time and identify plans for addressing the changes, alt-
hough the processes differ significantly regarding the level of analy-
sis and transparency.172 While many commentators point to the bene-
                                                                                                                  
 171. The elements of a robust electric utility planning process closely resemble the 
seven-step “felicific calculus” that Bentham proposed as a means to evaluate alterative 
courses of action: intensity (i.e., how strong is the pleasure or pain); duration (i.e., how long 
will the pleasure or pain last); certainty (i.e., how certain is the actor that the pleasure or 
pain will occur); propinquity (i.e., how soon will the pleasure or pain occur); fecundity (i.e., 
will the action lead to similar pleasures or pains in the future); purity (i.e., how pure is the 
pleasure or pain); and extent (i.e., what is the net impact of the action). BENTHAM, supra 
note 8, at 3. Although Bentham used different language than contemporary utility plan-
ners and regulators, there are direct analogies between the elements of the calculus and 
the multiple variables that will determine the long-term cost of electricity and impacts of 
the system. See id. Mill refined Bentham’s approach by noting that maximizing utility is 
not simply a quantitative exercise, adding up pleasures on one side and pains on the other. 
As Mill explained, some pleasures are more desirable than others and, conversely, some 
pains less desirable than others. In addition, some pleasures and pains are impossible to 
compare with one another. For example, intellectual pleasures and physical pains occur on 
different planes. J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 57 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (“It is better to be a 
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied.”). Similarly, PUCs may view some factors as more important than others, such as 
prioritizing reliability over environmental protection. See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY 
CORP., POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPACTS OF EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN (2014), 
http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/Potential_Reliability_
Impacts_of_EPA_Proposed_CPP_Final.pdf. 
 172. The IRP concept has its roots in the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA). 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (2012). PURPA established federal standards that, 
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fits of the IRP process,173 the approach has not enjoyed universal 
support. For example, when efforts to implement IRP requirements 
and efforts to restructure electricity markets were in their early 
phases, Black and Pierce contrasted the “deregulatory trend” that 
“relies where possible on markets, private incentives, and decentral-
ized decisions to produce optimal pricing and consumption of electric 
power and least-cost pollution control” with “faith in central planning 
(‘integrated resource planning’ is the new phrase)” and observed that 
IRP “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the systems previously 
used to govern the economies of eastern Europe and the former  
Soviet Union.”174  
Such dire predictions about IRPs ushering in Soviet-era regulation 
for the U.S. electricity sector have proven unfounded, and there re-
main open questions regarding the pros and cons of restructuring 
electricity markets. Instead, IRPs can be an important tool in the ef-
fort to assess risks and impacts of electricity generation choices, but 
there are limits to the IRP process as conducted in many states. 
PUCs may lack the resources to perform independent verification, 
and nongovernmental stakeholders may therefore have difficulty en-
gaging in the planning process. The process also depends on assump-
tions about future demand, fuel prices, and technology prices that 
may or may not prove to be accurate in the long run. Electric utilities 
often conduct the analysis using proprietary modeling tools that are 
not made available for PUC staff or stakeholders to test different as-
sumptions. Commissions may also have limited opportunity to ques-
tion the utility. Finally, utilities may have a disincentive to highlight 
scenarios that conflict with the firm’s goals. 
Despite these potential shortcomings, there are examples of IRP 
processes that consider a wider range of potential scenarios regard-
ing economics, technology, and regulation. The process developed by 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is a particularly robust effort 
to identify optimal planning pathways for the next twenty years after 
                                                                                                                  
though not mandatory, “would evolve into ‘integrated resource planning’ by the industry, 
where both generating facilities and load management/conservation techniques would be 
weighed in developing least-cost electricity services.” Rudy Perkins, Electricity Deregula-
tion, Environmental Externalities and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 903, 1004 
(1998). 
 173. See, e.g., Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility 
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
371, 409-10 (2014) (“Integrated resource planning is a powerful tool that can be used to 
weigh options for the future of the utility system. Planners can assess the long-term cost 
and reliability impacts of different transmission paths, distributed generation, renewable 
resources, and technology like the smart grid.”).  
 174. Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Cen-
tral Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1341-42 
(1993). 
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considering a range of potential scenarios.175 TVA defines the purpose 
of its resource planning as “[t]he application of economic and engi-
neering analyses to the resource adequacy problem . . . specifically 
making investment decisions to minimize fixed and variable costs, 
while maintaining appropriate resource adequacy.”176 This is a vari-
ant on the least cost approach followed by many state PUCs. Charac-
terized as a “no-regrets” approach, the TVA IRP process considers 
cost, financial risk, environmental stewardship, macro economic ef-
fects, and flexibility by evaluating numerous planning strategies 
across seven potential future scenarios. 177  TVA employees solicit 
stakeholder feedback on the range of scenarios included in the IRP 
process, and TVA summarizes the results in a scorecard that is easily 
accessible to the lay audience.178 Together, these variables allow TVA 
“to make the best decisions in a dynamic, ever-changing regulatory 
and economic environment.”179  
Despite the robust planning and the explicit consideration of envi-
ronmental impacts, the TVA’s “no-regrets” planning process did not 
lead to the conclusion that it should retire all coal-fired generation. 
As recently as December 2014, the TVA directors opted to retrofit two 
134 MW coal-fired units located in Kentucky for a cost of $185 mil-
                                                                                                                  
 175. TVA is not subject to state PUC oversight.  
 176. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., EXPLORING LEAST-REGRETS RESOURCE PLANNING: A FORUM 
ON MODELING FOR LONG-RANGE POWER SUPPLY STUDIES 3 (2014); Dallas Burtraw et al., 
Reliability in the U.S. Electricity Industry Under New Environmental Regulations, 62 
ENERGY POL’Y 1078 (2013). 
 177. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN: TVA’S ENVIRONMENTAL & 
ENERGY FUTURE 13-14 (2011), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1217/ML12171A189.pdf. 
TVA defines a “no-regrets” process as one  
in which all relevant and available information was analyzed in a careful and 
considered fashion, with significant attention paid to what would happen if the 
future unfolds in an unexpected way.  
  In other words, strategic options were analyzed not only from the perspec-
tive of what was expected to occur in the future, but also from the perspective 
of what was possible to occur in the future. Using this framework, decisions 
made today and in the near future are not overly dependent on the future un-
folding exactly as expected. Therefore, this IRP should provide benefit and val-
ue to stakeholders even if the future turns out to be different than predicted.  
Id. at 13; see also GARY BRINKWORTH, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TVA’S 2015 IRP: MORE THAN A 
LEAST COST ENERGY PLAN (2014), http://www.aaes.auburn.edu/water/resources/Presentations/ 
2014%20AL%20WR%20Conference/documents/3-Brinkworth-IRPoverviewALwaterconf0903a. 
pdf (summarizing the IRP framework). 
 178. See TENN. VALLEY AUTH., supra note 177, at 102-03; see also BRINKWORTH, supra 
note 177, at 13 (noting that resource plans are scored using a particular set of metrics re-
flected in the scorecard design). 
 179. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., supra note 177, at 10.  
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lion.180 It does, however, more fully evaluate the costs and societal 
impacts of resource decisions, allowing decision-makers to better un-
derstand the potential outcomes of their actions. 
Commissions wishing to take the broadest view of scenario analy-
sis to develop a comprehensive evaluation of electric utility invest-
ments and their impacts could consider the following factors: the po-
tential worst-case scenarios; the expected lifetime of a facility; the 
degree of uncertainty that could affect an investment’s costs and im-
pacts; how soon a decision must be made; and the potential for the 
investment to restrict choices in the future.181 Undertaking such a 
broad analysis in a transparent fashion can elucidate the choices in-
herent in the process, demonstrate the breadth of options available 
under the least cost framework, and allow affected stakeholders to 
develop informed views regarding the future of a state’s electricity 
sector.  
Evaluation of worst-case scenarios may consider a range of factors 
relevant to the least cost inquiry, including costs associated with con-
structing and operating a facility, the potential impacts on system 
reliability, and the potential impacts on public health and the envi-
ronment. The analysis may also consider the costs that could arise if 
unanticipated changes occur during the lifetime of the facility. The 
billions of dollars associated with abandoned nuclear construction 
projects in the 1980s are a prime example of the intensity considera-
tion.182 The drop in electricity demand that contributed to the deci-
sions to abandon the nuclear projects also resulted in unfinished 
natural gas-fired facilities, but at a fraction of the cost.183  
The degree of exposure to changing circumstances depends in 
large part on the expected lifetime of a facility. The longer a facility 
remains in operation, the more likely it is that new technologies will 
emerge that can generate electricity at a lower cost, reduce environ-
mental impacts, or both. Regulatory requirements affecting energy 
production and delivery will change over time, and more stringent 
environmental regulations will likely be promulgated over time as 
                                                                                                                  
 180. Dave Flessner, $185 Million OK’d by TVA to Upgrade Kentucky Coal Plant, TIMES 
FREE PRESS (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/ 
story/2014/dec/31/185-million-okd-tva-upgrade-kentucky-coal-plant/280406/. 
 181. Although Bentham used different language than contemporary utility planners 
and regulators, there are parallels between the elements of the seven-step “felicific calcu-
lus” that Bentham proposed as a means to evaluate alterative courses of action and the 
multi-variable analytic process to produce a robust assessment of long-term cost impacts of 
electricity sector investments and potential externalities created by those investments. For 
an overview of Bentham’s seven-step “felicific calculus” and John Stuart Mill’s critique of 
the analysis, see supra note 171.  
 182. See Pierce, supra note 26, at 497-99. 
 183. Id. at 500-04. 
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new public health information emerges.184 Additionally, new infor-
mation will almost certainly emerge regarding electricity demand, 
public health impacts, and fuel prices. Duration does not counsel 
solely for projects with short lifespans. There may be value in know-
ing that an asset, once placed in service, would operate for long peri-
ods of time with relatively stable prices. For example, although nu-
clear power plants are quite expensive to build, they are relatively 
inexpensive to operate assuming no significant repair costs are  
necessary.185  
As described above in Section III.B, significant uncertainty exists 
regarding the future of natural gas prices, future electricity demand, 
future technology costs, and future regulatory requirements. Unan-
ticipated changes in one or more of these factors could result in dra-
matic rate increases, stranded assets (if operating a power plant be-
comes uneconomic before its capital costs are fully paid off), or both. 
The degrees of uncertainty may exist along a spectrum. For example, 
the policymaker applying this criterion may distinguish between 
near-term uncertainty in the potential for price volatility in natural 
gas markets, where limited supply results in temporary price spikes, 
and the potential for wide variation in long-term price trajectories. 
Regulatory uncertainty may also exist along a spectrum. Using mer-
cury regulation as an example, electric utilities have known that lim-
itations on mercury emissions were likely at some point during the 
lifetime of coal-fired power plants. Section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air 
Act required the EPA to regulate mercury emissions.186 Frustrated 
with inaction, Congress overhauled the hazardous air pollution re-
quirements in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, resulting in a 
more prescriptive and stringent mandate.187 Rather than require im-
mediate regulation of mercury emissions from electric utilities, the 
revised section 112 included a compromise that required the EPA to 
undertake a study of the hazards to public health resulting from 
emissions at coal-fired electric generating units and regulate those 
emissions if the EPA Administrator determines that such regulation 
is “appropriate and necessary.”188 The EPA made such a finding in 
                                                                                                                  
 184. See Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility 
Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection Goals, 
38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (2013).  
 185. See Levelized Cost, supra note 154; see, e.g., Crystal River Nuclear Plant, DUKE 
ENERGY, https://www.duke-energy.com/power-plants/nuclear/crystal-river.asp (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2016) (reporting Duke Energy’s decision to retire the Crystal River nuclear plant 
in Florida due to significant repair costs). 
 186. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685. 
 187. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, tit. I, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012)). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (n)(1)(A). 
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2000.189 This action put in motion a regulatory process that resulted 
in an overturned EPA proposal in 2008.190 A follow-up rule was final-
ized in 2011.191 Section 112 of the Clean Air Act requires compliance 
within three years after the EPA promulgates a final rule, with the 
possibility of a one-year extension for individual electric generating 
units.192 Although the precise regulatory requirement was unknown 
until the promulgation of the final Utility MATS rule, there was in-
creasing certainty that coal-fired power plants would face limits on 
mercury emissions.  
In the electricity sector context, assessing the timeline for the de-
cision is critical. Is electricity demand expected to grow significantly 
in the near-term? Does the near-term need preclude certain genera-
tion options with long permitting and construction timelines?193 Are 
there strategies for delaying the decision, such as investments in en-
ergy efficiency, demand response, increased utilization of existing 
plants, or through power purchase agreements? As the Duke Energy 
Cliffside example demonstrates,194 investments to meet a projected 
near-term need for additional capacity may constrain the options 
available to a PUC if future circumstances suggest an alternative 
approach could better serve electricity demand and mitigate costs. 
Assessing both the potential for the investment to contribute to low 
rates and reliable power as well as the potential for economic or regu-
latory developments to cause higher rates or reliability concerns may 
support a higher-cost investment if it is likely to produce desirable 
outcomes in a range of future scenarios.195  
                                                                                                                  
 189. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000).  
 190. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the Clean Air 
Mercury Rule). 
 191. Utility MATS, supra note 116. 
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(3)(B). Implementation timelines are uncertain in the after-
math of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 holding that the EPA must consider costs when 
determining whether regulation under section 112 is “appropriate and necessary.” See 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2716 (2015). 
 193. See, e.g., Natural Gas Technology, AM. ELECTRIC POWER, http://www.aep.com/ 
about/IssuesAndPositions/Generation/Technologies/NaturalGas.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 
2016) (“Natural gas generating plants are constructed much more quickly than coal fired 
generation. Simple cycle plants are typically constructed in 18 to 30 months and combined 
cycle plants are constructed in about 36 months. These lead times are significantly less 
than the average for solid fuel plants (i.e. coal plants), about 72 months.”). 
 194. See discussion supra Section III.A.2. 
 195. See generally Bean & Hoppock, supra note 64 (discussing how the decision-making 
timeline is affected by uncertainty). 
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B.   Maximizing Utility by Seeking Multi-Benefit Strategies 
Despite the limitations of economic assessments regarding long-
term electricity system costs, it is nonetheless possible to identify 
categories of risks, such as increasing stringency of environmental 
policy or the potential for reduced demand, to result in stranded as-
sets. As demonstrated in Part III, the least cost mandate is more 
malleable than is often appreciated by PUCs and could allow com-
missions to evaluate the range of possible actions against the risks 
facing the sector to identify strategies that minimize the risk. In ad-
dition to evaluating a broad range of options in an effort to minimize 
potential regrets if circumstances change, PUCs could include an ad-
ditional layer of analysis to consider strategies that offer additional 
benefits in addition to affordable rates.  
For example, the EPA’s current efforts to limit CO2 emissions 
from existing sources under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act could 
be viewed as yet another challenge affecting near-term electric utility 
planning. The broad statutory language in section 111, combined 
with the limited application of section 111(d) and the lack of any ju-
dicial decisions interpreting the section, has led numerous scholars 
and stakeholders to conclude that compliance options could include a 
wide range of strategies to reduce emissions from the power sector as 
a whole rather than focusing on reductions at each individual covered 
unit.196 This reading of section 111(d) compliance options, if upheld by 
the courts, could allow PUC commissioners and environmental regu-
lators to seek regulatory approaches that achieve additional benefits 
for the electricity sector. For example, end-use energy efficiency may 
qualify as a compliance option under section 111(d).197 It may also 
reduce near-term demand and allow utilities to delay capital invest-
ments during a period of uncertainty. Similarly, renewable energy 
generation could play a role in section 111(d) compliance while also 
increasing diversity in the energy mix as a means to hedge against 
natural gas price volatility.   
Other multi-benefit strategies may include requirements that util-
ities act early to limit a range of pollutants in anticipation of more 
                                                                                                                  
 196. See, e.g., JEREMY M. TARR ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLS., DUKE 
UNIV., REGULATING CARBON DIOXIDE UNDER SECTION 111(D) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 
OPTIONS, LIMITS, AND IMPACTS (2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/ 
files/publications/ni_r_13-01.pdf; Ann E. Carlson & Megan M. Herzog, Text in Context: The 
Fate of Emergent Climate Regulation After UARG and Eme Homer, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 23, 30 (2015); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 37 (2014); MONAST & HOPPOCK, supra note 142. 
 197. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664, 64,666 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 
CFR pt. 60 (2015)). 
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stringent regulations in the future. North Carolina’s Clean Smoke-
stacks Act, adopted in 2002, required utilities to limit SO2 and  
NOX emissions before the CAIR/CSAPR rules were promulgated.198 
The Clean Smokestacks Act instructed utilities to act early and  
provided a longer timeline to achieve compliance thereby allowing 
North Carolina’s utilities to adjust retrofit decisions as they learned 
more about federal rules. As a result, North Carolina’s utilities were  
largely unaffected by the CAIR, CSAPR, and the Utility MATS rules. 
These early steps not only avoided rate shocks when the rules were 
finalized, but also resulted in significant health benefits for North 
Carolina’s citizens.199  
While it is generally not within the purview of the PUC to directly 
address potential public health impacts, understanding the public 
health and environmental impacts of utility’s choices can help PUCs 
better assess the risk of increased regulatory stringency. This infor-
mation could allow PUCs to consider the potential long-term compli-
ance costs associated with various options for meeting, or reducing, 
electricity demand. Explicit consideration of environmental impacts, 
therefore, may fit within the PUC’s existing statutory mandate. 
PUCs may not have the institutional competency to fully assess these 
risks. More effective information sharing across state agencies, in-
cluding coordination between environmental regulators and economic 
regulators, could address this hurdle. 
C.   Maximizing Utility by Dispersing Risk 
Once a PUC determines that a utility investment was prudently 
incurred, the risk of the investment generally shifts to consumers.200 
If electricity demand drops or other generation options become more 
cost effective—both situations that have occurred in the aftermath of 
the 2008 economic recession—utilities may still recover the full cost 
of the original investment. Although PUCs may not reverse decisions 
incorporating prudent utility investments into the rate base, utilities 
and their investors still face a degree of financial risk with large-
scale infrastructure investments. The cost of capital may rise, or pro-
jects may face cancellation due to cost overruns or technological fail-
ures.201 The most notable examples of utility sector investor risk are 
found in post hoc efforts to allocate the costs of nuclear units that 
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never entered service, thus failing the “used and useful” test.202 PUCs 
may also preemptively limit the total costs that ratepayers will face 
due to cost overruns, providing a firm signal for utilities to incorpo-
rate such costs into the investment risk analysis.203 
As previously discussed in Section III.B, technology is changing 
rapidly, the price of renewable energy is continuing to fall, natural 
gas prices may experience periods of volatility, and the economy may 
continue to become more energy efficient.204 Given the level of uncer-
tainty facing electricity providers and regulators, both of whom are 
responsible for ensuring that there is a sufficient supply of electricity 
to meet demand at all times, it may require a rethinking of what 
qualifies as a prudent investment. For example, energy efficiency and 
demand response investments may allow utilities to delay new capi-
tal investments until they have more information about demand 
growth and the stability of natural gas supply. Power purchase 
agreements in lieu of capital investments may also allow utilities to 
gather more information before acting. There could also be a prefer-
ence for smaller scale generation or generation with a shorter con-
struction lead-time.  
This approach could shift some level of risk back to utilities and 
their shareholders, which is a delicate balance and could affect utili-
ties’ ability to attract capital. Shareholders may view this approach 
as reducing overall utility because it creates a disincentive for in-
vestment by increasing risk and potentially significantly reducing 
returns. Ratepayers may also face higher prices if utilities are seen 
as a more risky investment and thus charged higher interest rates to 
access capital. This should not be seen as an absolute barrier to par-
tial risk shifting. Investors already accept investment risk in other 
contexts. While investors may prefer the certainty that comes along 
with guaranteed returns on investment, consumers would prefer not 
to be solely responsible for long-term investments that may result in 
higher electricity rates. Reallocating some business risk could result 
in better decisions in the long-term, but it is an important factor to 
understand and balance with other goals. 
Shifting risk could cut both ways regarding energy innovation.205 
This strategy could make it more difficult to pursue early-stage tech-
                                                                                                                  
 202. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Lesser, The Used and Useful Test: Implications for a Re-
structured Electric Industry, 23 ENERGY L.J. 349, 356-57 (2002); James J. Hoecker, “Used 
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 204. See supra Section III.B. 
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nologies such as coal-fired generation with carbon capture technolo-
gies due to the high capital costs, long planning and construction 
horizon, and considerable uncertainty regarding future electricity 
demand and technology costs for other generation options. On the 
other hand, shifting a degree of risk away from ratepayers does not 
necessarily place the risk on shareholders. Public policy choices to 
support innovative energy technologies through tax credits, federal 
loan guarantees, and technology grants may allow early stage tech-
nologies to enter the marketplace without requiring ratepayers to 
bear the cost and technology risk. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
PUC decisions will play a critical role in determining how the elec-
tricity sector evolves over the next few decades, including the rates 
consumers will pay and the societal impacts that will result. The 
least cost framework provides commissioners a significant amount of 
discretion to consider the full suite of potential actions and their im-
pacts, even if their state legislatures do not explicitly instruct them 
to value non-cost objectives. Failure to consider the wide range of po-
tential impacts could result in higher costs over the operating life of a 
facility, and failure to evaluate potential costs and benefits resulting 
from an electric utility decision could frustrate the underlying goal of 
PUC processes: providing the greatest good to the greatest number 
by ensuring a long-term, affordable, and reliable electricity sector. 
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